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ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF REPRODUCTION:
VIRGIN TERRITORY FOR LEGISLATION
Kathryn Venturatos Lorio*
Freedom to have sex without reproduction does not guarantee
freedom to have reproduction without sex.'
Approximately seventeen percent of all couples of reproductive age
have difficulty becoming parents.2 For those desiring children but unable
to have them in the traditional way, the new methods of reproduction
are the miracles they have been awaiting. Yet, in a society consumed with
overpopulation and decisions to terminate pregnancies, the rights of those
attempting to create life have been relatively ignored. One reason may
be that it is difficult for those with children to truly understand the
dilemma of the involuntarily childless.' Another is that medical advances
have outpaced the ability of society to accommodate those advances. It
is essential that the social, legal and moral ramifications of the new
reproductive technologies be closely examined. To cavalierly dismiss the
technologies as distasteful or eccentric would be inhumane. Yet, to allow
them to develop unchecked could severely damage not only the parties
and the resulting children, but also the society to which the latter are born.
Complicating the matter is the fact that adoption is not as viable an
option as it once was,4 partially due to the accessibility of abortion and
to society's increasing acceptance of unwed mothers who choose to keep
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1. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and
Childbirth, 69 Va. L. Rev. 405, 406 (1983).
2. Infertility: Couple's Reactions, N.Y. Times, July 26, 1982, § 1, at 13, col. I. A
couple is considered medically infertile if after one year of trying, they are unable to have
children. Greater than three million women want children and cannot conceive. Id.
3. Barbara Menning, founder of Resolve, a counseling and referral agency for infer-
tile couples, spoke in defense of in vitro fertilization (IVF) at a conference concerning "The
Ethical Issues of Human Reproductive Technology" (June 1979, Hampshire College, Amherst,
Massachusetts):
At the Ethics Advisory Board hearings it was amazing how many "Right to Lifers"
and other witnesses stood up and gave among their credentials the number of
children they had borne, as if to add credibility to their testimony. In my opin-
ion, and in the opinion of other infertile women, the fact that they had achieved
their families disqualified them from any understanding of the pain of childlessness.
Hubbard, The Case Against In Vitro Fertilization and Implantation, in The Custom Made
Child 259 (1981).
4. Nationwide, there is a long waiting list for legally available Caucausian infants,
and even toddlers and pre-schoolers. "Special needs" children, i.e., those with physical,
emotional, and mental handicaps, are more readily available but much less in demand.
Telephone interview with Gloria O'Day, Administrator of Adoption Services, Ass'n of Catholic
Charities of New Orleans (Feb. 2, 1984).
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and raise their children. The waiting period for adopting a child can be
five years or more.' Couples who have delayed starting families-whether
for educational, financial or career reasons-may not discover their dif-
ficulty in conceiving until they are well into their thirties. Then, if they
take time to undergo infertility treatment before applying for adoption,
they are often met with the disappointment of rejection due to their age.'
In the meantime, medical science has been making great strides in
providing new alternatives for these couples-choices that could result in
a child that is the genetic offspring of at least one member of the couple.
However, the law either is silent on the regulation of these new procreative
methods, or attempts to deal with them in terms of existing statutes or
cases which were written at a time when these new modes of reproduc-
tion were not envisioned. 7
Any regulation of the new reproductive methods must be drafted with
a recognition that the right to procreate has been cited by the United
States Supreme Court as "fundamental to the very existence and survival
of the race." ' As relating to the accessibility and use of contraceptives,
that right to privacy has been guaranteed to both the married9 and the
unmarried.'" Thus, it is not unreasonable to assume that the right to
privacy extends to persons availing themselves of the new means of
reproduction." Yet, even when fundamental rights are concerned and
courts examine state regulation with strict scrutiny, a "compelling govern-
mental interest"'" may exist, allowing regulation by the least restrictive
means.' 3 Relying on its interest in the health of its citizens, a state might
attempt to regulate the use of new medical techniques-requiring they be
5. Rushevsky, Legal Recognition of Surrogate Gestation, 7 Women's Rts. L. Rep.
107, 108 n.4 (1982). Ms. Gloria O'Day states that by the time most couples come to the
Association of Catholic Charities, they have already been through a long fertility work-up
which may have lasted anywhere from two to five years. They are then informed that depend-
ing on the rigidity of their expectations, the waiting time may be another three to five
years. Telephone interview, supra note 4.
6. Ms. O'Day stated that there can be no more than forty-five years between the
age of the child and the adopting parents. The Association of Catholic Charities will take
formal applications from couples up to 37 years old. However, in the case of "special needs"
children, see supra note 4, there may be some flexibility to this rule. Telephone interview,
supra note 4.
7. Robertson, supra note I, at 426.
8. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
9. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
10. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
11. See Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (declaring that
the "decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart of [the] cluster
of constitutionally protected choices").
12. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
13. See generally Note, The Less Restrictive Alternative in Constitutional Adjudica-
tion: An Analysis, A Justification, and Some Criteria, 27 Vand. L. Rev. 971, 1029-36 (1974).
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performed only by licensed personnel in hospitals or under certain condi-
tions. Similarly, even if the state's interest in preserving the family is not
accepted as compelling enough to prohibit the use of these techniques
by the unmarried,' states would not be obligated to provide the services' 5
nor to fund them. 6
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
One of the older' 7 and more common'8 forms of alternative procrea-
tion is artificial insemination, or the injection by instrument of semen
into the women's reproductive tract for the purpose of procreation. 9 For
married women, there are basically two types of artificial insemination:
artificial insemination husband and artificial insemination donor. 20
Artificial insemination husband is used in cases in which a husband
is either physically unable to have sexual intercourse, or more commonly,
14. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
15. See generally Robertson, supra note 1, at 420 n.36:
A finding that single persons have a right to procreate would not, however,
guarantee access to noncoital reproductive services. In some instances, there would
be no state action involved; in others, there would be no obligation on the state
to provide these services, or to provide them equally to married persons and single
persons.
16. Cf. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 311 (1980) (New York, a participant in the
Medicaid program, was under no obligation to fund abortions for which federal reimburse-
ment was unavailable under the Hyde Amendment.); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 480
(1977) (The Supreme Court recognized the right of states to exclude non-therapeutic abor-
tions from Medicaid funding.); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977) (Cities have a
right to refuse funding for non-therapeutic abortions while choosing to fund related child
birth expenses.).
17. The first documented artificial insemination of humans is credited to English surgeon
John Hunter in 1790. Shaman, Legal Aspects of Artificial Insemination, 18 J. Fam. L.
331 (1980) (citing W. Finegold, Artificial Insemination 6 (1964)).
18. Wadlington, Artificial Conception: The Challenge For Family Law, 69 Va. L. Rev.
465, 472 (1983). Compare also note 33. In 1980 it was estimated that about 20,000 children
a year were born as a result of the artificial insemination donor (A.I.D.) method. Fleming,
New Frontiers in Conception: Medical Breakthroughs and Moral Dilemmas, N.Y. Times,
July 20, 1980, § 6 (Magazine), at 14.
19. This does not include sexual intercourse with one other than the husband for pur-
poses of conceiving a child. See In Re Adoption of McFadyen, 108 Ill. App. 3d 329, 438
N.E.2d 1362, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1259 (1983) (On appeal from the granting of adop-
tion, conceding that her husband was not the biological father of her child, Mrs. McFadyen
argued that her sterile husband was the legal father because he had consented to her having
intercourse with other men for the purposes of impregnating her. The circuit court noted
that as a matter of law, such an arrangement was not the legal equivalent to artificial
insemination.).
20. A third possible type of artificial insemination is confused or combined artificial
insemination (C.A.I). This involves the mixing of the husband's sperm with that of a donor.
The woman may become impregnated by either husband or donor, thus providing some
psychological comfort not present with artificial insemination donor. Wadlington, supra note
18 at 469-70.
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has a low sperm count. 2 ' By collecting semen samples and aggregating
them to increase the sperm count or simply by directing the sperm closer
to the egg and shortening the distance the sperm must travel to meet the
egg, the inseminator enhances the possibility of inducing pregnancy.
Since the child born of artificial insemination husband is the biological
product of a married couple, no genealogy problems are involved.
However, other legal questions may arise. For example, in L. V.L. 22
a woman who had conceived a child through artificial insemination hus-
band sought an annulment. Holding that artificial insemination husband
did not constitute consummation of the marriage, the English court granted
her request. Also, proof of legitimacy may be a problem in instances where
the husband's sperm is frozen and the actual insemination is not per-
formed until well after the husband's death. In such cases, the child may
not be able to avail himself of the common legal presumption that the
husband is the father of any child born within three hundred days of
a marriage.3
Artificial insemination donor presents many more complications. Early
cases deemed the act adulterous, as exemplified by a Canadian court in
Orford v. Orford2 in which a woman had been inseminated without her
husband's consent. In the 1954 Illinois case of Doornbos v. Doornbos,25
the stigma of adultery was imposed even though the husband had con-
sented to the process. Likewise, the child born of artificial insemination
was pronounced illegitimate as late as 1963 by a New York court in Gur-
sky v. Gursky, 6 where the court noted that artificial insemination donor
children were not adopted pursuant to state law, nor were they legiti-
mized by statute. The modern, enlightened view is that it is the sexual
21. A man is considered oligospermic if his sperm density is less than 20 million per
milliliter. Short, Human In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer § 4, at 310 (1979),
in Ethics Advisory Board, U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, Appendix: HEW Sup-
port of Research Involving Human In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer [hereinafter
cited as Ethics Advisory Board, Appendix]. See also R. Dickey, S. Taylor & D. Curole,
The Fertility Institute of New Orleans In Vitro Fertilization-Patient Information (available
from the Fertility Institute of New Orleans, Suite 118, 9830 Lake Forest Blvd., New Orleans,
La. 70127) [hereinafter cited as R. Dickey, Patient Information].
22. 119491 1 All E.R. 141, 146.
23. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code. art. 185 ("A child born less than three hundred days
after the dissolution of the marriage is presumed to have been conceived during the mar-
riage .. "). For a discussion of this presumption, see Kinney, Legal Issues of the New
Reproductive Technologies, 52 Calif. St. B.J. 514, 514 (1977).
24. 58 D.L.R. 251 (1921).
25. No. 54 S. 14981 (Super. Ct. Cook County), 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 (1954), appeal dis-
missed on procedural grounds, 12 Ill. App. 2d 473, 139 N.E.2d 844 (1956). Contrast the
unreported case of Hoch v. Hoch, No. 44-C-8307 (Cir. A Cook County, Il1. 1945), which
did not find the artificial insemination donor adulterous, even though the husband had
not consented.
26. 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
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act, not the placing of the male seed in the female body, that is
adulterous.7
This more liberal view has been adopted by a number of courts which
have pronounced children born of artificial insemination donor legitimate.
Rejecting the Gursky rationale, a New York court in In re Adoption of
Anonymous"8 opted to protect the child whose parents had consented to
artificial insemination donor during their marriage. Likewise, the Califor-
nia Supreme Count in People v. Sorensen29 extended the definition of
"father" beyond the biological father to a husband who, unable to beget
a child, purchased semen from a donor for purposes of inseminating his
wife."
Many of the legal questions associated with artificial insemination
could be alleviated by carefully drafted legislation. Two major difficulties
presently exist. First, only twenty-one states have any legislation dealing
with artificial insemination donor.3 Second, even where it exists, the
legislation often does not go far enough, leaving many legal queries to
baffle future courts.
One area that requires more attention is the husband's consent. What
constitutes consent? Must it be written? How long is it effective?32 Only
sixteen of the states' statutes mention the need for written consent of
the husband, although all suggest that some form of consent is required.33
27. People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 289, 437 P.2d 495, 501, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7, 13
(1968); MacLennan v. MacLennan, [1958] Sess. Cas. 105.
28. 74 Misc. 2d 99, 345 N.Y.S. 2d 430, 434 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
29. 68 Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968).
30. See also Strnad v. Strnad, 190 Misc. 786, 78 NY.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (Analog-
ized the artificial insemination donor (A.I.D.) husband to an adopting foster father).
31. Louisiana Civil Code article 188 states in pertinent part: "The husband also cannot
disavow paternity of a child born as the result of artificial insemination of the mother to
which he consented." Alaska Stat. § 25.20.045 (Supp. 1983); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 61-141(c)
(1971); Cal. Civ. Code § 7005 (West 1983); Cal. Penal Code § 270 (West 1970); Conn.
Gen. Stat §§ 45-69f to - 69n (1981); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1984) (irrebut-
table presumption of legitimacy); Ga. Code Ann. § 74-101.1 [19-7-21] & [43-34-421 (1982)
(irrebuttable presumption of legitimacy); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1974 & Supp
1978); Md. Est. & Trusts Code Ann. § 1-206(b) (1974); Md. Health & Gen. Code Ann.
§ 20-214 (1982); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 333.2824(6), 700.111(2) (1980); Mont. Code
Ann. § 40-6-106 (1983); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 126.061 (1981); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 73 (Con-
sol. 1977); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 49 A(1) (1976); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §§ 551-553 (West
Supp 1983-1984); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109.247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365,
677.370, 677.990 (1981); Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-3-306 (1983); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 12.03
(Vernon 1975); Va. Code § 64.1-7.1 (1980); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.26.050 (West Supp.
1984-1985); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 767.47(9), 891.40 (West Supp. 1983-1984); see also Unif.
Parentage Act § 5, 9 U.L.A. 592 (1979).
32. R.S. v. R.S., 670 P.2d 923 (Kan. 1983) (Although the Kansas statute requires the
husband's written consent, a husband was equitably estopped from denying paternity when
he had orally consented to the artificial insemination of his wife.).
33. Alaska Stat. § 25.20.045 (1983) (consented to in writing); Cal. Civ. Code § 7005
164519841
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Of those sixteen, only nine require that the consent be recorded. 4 In those
instances, the records are kept confidential and may only be opened by
court order on a showing of good cause.
(Supp. 1983) (stating that husband's consent must be in writing and signed by husband
and wife); Cal. Penal Code § 270 (West 1970) ("The husband of a woman who bears a
child as the result of artificial insemination shall be considered the father of that child
for the purposes of this section, if he consented in writing ....") (emphasis added); Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 45-69g (1981) ("A.I.D. shall not be performed unless the physician receives
in writing the request and consent of the husband and wife."); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 742.11
(West Supp. 1984) (both the husband and wife have consented in writing); Ga. Code Ann.
§ 74-101.1 [19-7-21] (1982) (both spouses consented in writing); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 23-128
(1974) (the consent in writing of the husband and wife); Mont. Code Ann. § 40-6-106 (1983)
("The husband's consent must be in writing and signed by him and his wife."); Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 126.061 (1981) ("The husband's consent must be in writing and signed by the party
and his wife."); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 73 (Consol. 1977) (consent in writing of woman
and her husband); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 49-A(1) (1976) (the husband and wife requesting and
consenting in writing); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit, 10, §551 (West Supp. 1983-1984) (consent in
writing of the husband and wife); Or. Rev. Stat. § 677.365 (1981) ("Artificial insemination
shall not be performed upon a woman without her prior written request and consent and,
if she is married, the written request and consent of her husband."); Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 12.03 (Vernon 1975) (consent must be in writing); Va. Code §64.1-7.1 (1980) (consent
in writing of such woman and her husband); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.26.050 (West
Supp. 1984-1985) ("The husband's consent must be in writing and signed by him and his
wife."); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1983-1984) ("The husband's consent must
be in writing and signed by him and his wife."). Note that the Maryland and Michigan
statutes state that the consent of the husband is presumed; however, Michigan states that
the presumption is rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence. Md. Est. & Trusts Code
Ann. § 1-206(b) (1974) (consent of husband presumed.); Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. § 700.111
(2) (1980) ("Consent of the husband is presumed unless contrary is shown by clear and
convincing evidence."); Unif. Parentage Act § 5, 9A U.L.A. 592 (1979) (The husband of
a woman who conceives a child through A.I.D. with the husband's consent is treated as
the natural father.). See also La. Civ. Code art. 188 (stating that a husband who has con-
sented to artificial insemination of his wife cannot disavow paternity). Although there is
no formal requirement for written consent, most physicians performing artificial insemina-
tion donor in Louisiana require signed informed consent as a matter of course. Interview
with Richard P. Dickey, M.D., Director of the Fertility Institute of New Orleans, in New
Orleans, Louisiana (Feb. 7, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Dickey interview]; Interview with
Staff of Omega Institute Laser Research Foundation, in New Orleans, (Feb 9, 1984); Inter-
view with Ronald W. Lewis, M.D., Tulane University Medical Center Fertility Clinic, in
New Orleans (Feb. 13, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Lewis interview]; Telephone interview
with William E. Roniger, M.D., Louisiana State Medical School Fertility Clinic (Feb. 23,
1984) [hereinafter cited as Roniger interview].
34. Cal. Civ. Code § 7005 (West 1983) ("The physician shall certify .. . [the hus-
band's and the wife's] signatures and the date of the insemination, and retain the husband's
consent as part of the medical record .. . [which shall be] kept confidential, and in a
sealed file.") (emphasis added); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45-69h (1981) ("(a) Whenever a child
is born . . . by the use of A.1.D., a copy of the request and consent required... .together
with a statement of the physician who performed the A.I.D., that to the best of his knowledge
the child was conceived through A.I.D., shall be filed with the judge of probate. . ..
(b) The information may be disclosed only to the persons executing the consent. No other
person shall have access. . . except upon order of the probate court for cause shown.")
(emphasis added); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 23-130 (West 1981) ("[C]onsent ...shall be executed
1646 [Vol. 44
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The issue of how long consent remains effective has been litigated
recently. In K.S. v. G.S.,35 a mother's request for child support for her
child was answered by the husband with a claim that although he had
initially consented to her insemination, his consent was withdrawn prior
to the child's conception. The New Jersey court noted that in the absence
of authority limiting the continuing effectiveness of consent, it is presumed
that consent continues unless the husband overcomes the burden of proof
by clear and convincing evidence.
Once consent has been given for artificial insemination, is the hus-
band deemed to be the father of any child conceived during the mar-
riage? The case of State ex rel. H. v. P.3 6 suggests that once a husband
consents to insemination, it will be difficult to deny the paternal tie. In
that case, a wife challenged her husband's paternity of her child. Although
it was conceded that she had been artificially inseminated with her hus-
band's consent on at least ten occasions prior to the conception of her
child, she claimed the biological father was a man with whom she had
been intimate on a business trip. The court denied her request for blood
tests, deeming her estopped from contesting the child's paternity.
In addition to requiring that the husband's consent be in writing and
recorded, states might consider providing a time period for the effectiveness
and acknowledged by both the husband and the wife .. .and an original . ..may be
filed under the same rules as adoption papers in the district court of the county in which
such husband and wife reside.") (emphasis added); Mont.. Code Ann. § 40-6-106 (1983)
("The physician shall certify . .. [the husband's and the wife's] signatures and the date
of the insemination and file the husband's consent with the department of health and en-
vironmental sciences, where it shall be kept confidential and in a sealed file.") (emphasis
added); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 126.061 (1983) ("The physician shall certify ... [the husband's
and the wife's] signatures and the date of the insemination, and file the husband's consent
with the health division of the department of human resources, where it must be kept con-
fidential and in a sealed file."), (emphasis added); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit 10, § 553 (West
Supp. 1983-1984) ("[Slaid consent shall be executed and acknowledged by both the hus-
band and wife and the person who is to perform the technique, and the judge having jurisdic-
tion over adoption of children, and an original thereof shall be filed under the same rules
as adoption papers. [It shall] not be open to the general public, and the information ...
may be released only to persons exacting such consent, or to persons having a legitimate
interest therein as evidenced by a specific court order.") (emphasis added); Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 677.365 (1981) ("[C]onsent... shall be filed by the physician who performs the artificial
insemination with the State Registrar of Vital Statistics . . . . [and] shall be sealed .. .
[and] opened only upon an order of a court of competent jurisdiction.") (emphasis added);
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.26.050 (West Supp. 1984-1985) ("The physician shall cer-
tify ... [The husband's and the wife's] signatures and the date of the insemination, and
file the husband's consent with the registrar of vital statistics, . . . [to be] kept confidential
and in a sealed file.") (emphasis added); Wis. Stat. Ann. §891.40 (West Supp. 1983 -1984)
("The physician shall certify . . . [the husband's and wife's] signatures and the date of
the insemination, and ...file the husband's consent with the department of health and
social services, . . . [which shall be] kept confidential.") (emphasis added).
35. 182 N.J. Super. 102, 440 A.2d 64 (1981).
36. 90 A.D.2d 434, 457 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1982).
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of the consent with another time period for renewal when the initial period
has expired. A determination should be made as to whether inaction would
result in a presumption of continued or withdrawn consent.
Besides providing a paternal link with the husband of the mother,
statutes should clearly relieve the donor of obligations to the child. Pre-
sently eight states explicitly do so." Others, such as Louisiana, are silent
on the subject. Although part of the legislative intent of the amending
of Civil Code article 209 on filiation may have been to eliminate dual
paternity,3" the Louisiana courts appear receptive to a dual paternity
argument." Thus, although a child is deemed the legitimate child of the
husband of the mother under Civil Code article 188 due to the husband's
consent to artificial insemination of his wife, it is still possible that the
child might attempt to establish filiation to the sperm donor. Any waiver
of paternal rights by the donor would not deprive the child from assert-
ing his rights against the donor. In order to protect both donors and
37. Cal. Civ. Code § 7005(b) (West 1983) ("The donor of semen.., to a licensed
physician for use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor's wife is treated
in law as if he were not the natural father of a child."); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45-69(j) (1981)
("A donor of sperm used in A.I.D., or any person claiming by or through him, shall not
have any right or interest in any child born as a result of A.I.D."); Mont. Code Ann.
§ 40-6-106(2) (1983); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 126.061 (1981) (Both the Montana and the Nevada
statutes employ the same language used by California in its donor provision which was
adopted from the Uniform Parentage Act.); Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.239 (1981) ("If the donor
... is not the mother's husband: (1) Such donor shall have no right, obligation or interest
with respect to a child born as a result of artificial insemination; and (2) A child . . .
shall have no right, obligation or interest with respect to such donor."); Tex Fam. Code
Ann. § 12.03(b) (Vernon 1975) ("If a woman is artificially inseminated, the resulting child
is not the child of the donor unless he is the husband."); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §
26.26.050(2) (West Supp. 1984-1985) (Washington's donor provision is similar to the Califor-
nia, Montana, and Nevada donor provisions but goes farther to state that the donor shall
not be the natural father "unless the donor and the woman agree in writing that said donor
shall be the father." Where such is the case, the same filing requirements are made as
if the donor were the husband of the woman consenting to artificial insemination.); Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1983-1984) (Wisconsin also tracks the language of the
California donor provision, but adds that "the [donor] bears no liability for the support
of the child and has no parental rights with regard to the child.").
38. La. Civ. Code art. 209 ("A child not entitled to legitimate filiation nor filiated
by the initiative of the parent by legitimation or by acknowledgment under Article 203 must
prove filiation as to an alleged living parent by a preponderance of the evidence in a civil
proceeding instituted by the child or on his behalf within the time limit provided in this
article."). See Fontenot v. Thierry, 422 So. 2d 586, 588-89 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982) (citing
Spaht, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981-Persons, 42 La. L. Rev. 403 (1982)).
39. In Succession of Levy, 428 So. 2d 904 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983), the court permit-
ted a child to prove filiation to his biological father, although the husband of the mother
had not disavowed the child. The court interpreted article 208 to mean that a child not
entitled to legitimate filiation "to the parent to whom he is attempting to prove filiation"
may bring an action to filiate. See also Malek v. Yekani-Fard, 422 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1982)
(stating that the marital status of the mother was irrelevant in a suit brought by a child
to establish filiation with one other than the husband of the mother).
1648 [Vol. 44
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children, statutes should clearly deny any legal relationship between donor
and child.
Artificial insemination also raises questions as to the liability of the
person performing the process. Generally, the procedure is performed by
a person with medical training. Twelve states actually require that the
procedure either be performed by a licensed physician or under his or
her supervision." This would presumably reduce the chances of infection
or negligent performance. There has been some opposition, particularly
from single women, to the requirement that the process be performed
only by a licensed physician. Objections have been raised by heterosexual
women who are unmarried, but whose "biological clock" is ticking away.
Not having found a mate, but desiring a child, some seek artificial in-
semination as the answer. Additionally, the argument has been raised by
lesbian women wishing to create a family unit.' Since the private physi-
cian can decide whether or not to perform a procedure and which pa-
40. Alaska Stat. § 25.20.045 (1982); Cal Civ. Code § 7005 (West 1983); Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 45-69(g) (1981) (by persons certified to practice medicine); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 126.061
(1983); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 73 (Consol. 1977) (performed by persons duly authorized
to practice medicine); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 553 (West Supp, 1983-1984) (requires a
currently licensed physician to perform artificial insemination); Or. Rev. Stat. 677.360 (1981)
(allows physicians and persons under their supervision to perform artificial insemination);
Va. Code § 64.1-7.1 (1980) (requires a licensed physician to perform the artificial insemina-
tion). The Georgia and the Maryland statutes are two of the strongest. Ga. Code Ann.
§ 74-101.1 [43-34-42] (Supp. 1983) (A 1982 opinion of the Georgia attorney general requires
that "performance of Artificial Insemination upon female human beings may not be delegated
by licensed physician to physician's assistant or other qualified allied health personnel.")
Md. Health & Gen. Code Ann. § 20-214(a) (1982) ("A person may not be required to
perform or participate in, or refer to any source for, any medical procedure that results
in artificial insemination .... ." The statute also relieves both physicians and hospitals
of any civil liability or disciplinary action for refusal to perform artificial insemination.).
41. D. Hitchens, Lesbians Choosing Motherhood: Legal Issues in Donor Insemination
(1983) (available from Lesbian Rights Project, 1370 Mission St., San Francisco, California
94103); The Lesbian Mother's Nat'l Defense Fund, Artificial Insemination Packet (available
from LMNDF, P.O. Box 21567, Seattle, Washington 98111). See also C.M. v. C.C., 152
N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (1977) (semen donor seeking visitation rights with respect
to a child born of artificial insemination of a single woman). But see Or. Rev. Stat. §
677.365 (1981) ("Artificial Insemination shall not be performed upon a woman without
prior written request and consent and, if she is married, the written request and consent
of her husband.") (emphasis added); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.26.050 (West Supp.
1984-1985) ("[D]onor of semen provided . . . for use in [the] artificial insemination of
a woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural father
of a child thereby conceived unless the donor and the woman agree in writing that said
donor shall be the father."). Both the Oregon and Washington statutes indicate that there
would be no statutory bar to single women wishing artificial insemination. Note, however,
that the Washington statute would require the donor in a single woman insemination to
agree in writing to be the father. Also note that it has been said that it is relatively easy
for single women to perform self-insemination. Robertson, supra note 1, at 418-20 n.36
(1983), citing Amateur Insemination, in the Next Whole Earth Catalogue 345 (1980). Curie-
Cohen, Luntrell & Shapiro, Current Practice of Artificial Insemination by Donor in The
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tients he will accept, many physicians might refuse, on moral grounds,
to administer artificial insemination donor to single women.4 2 If the physi-
cian is employed by a state facility, it may be argued that refusal to per-
form artificial insemination, based on the patient's marital status, is a
denial of equal protection. The argument is based on the presumption
that procreation is a fundamental right43 and the constitution guarantees
to "the individual, married or single, [the right] to be free from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." 4 4 In answer
to the equal protection argument, one might cite Maher v. Roe,'4 the
case which recognized the right of a state to exclude nontherapeutic abor-
tions from the federally funded Medicaid programs. In Maher, the
Supreme Court distinguished the state's refusal to include abortions in
the program from "direct state interference with a protected activity."4 6
Thus, even if a state could not show a compelling reason to criminalize
the use of artificial insemination donor by the unmarried, it is possible
that doctors in a state facility could refuse to administer the process to
the unmarried in an attempt to discourage it. Some legislatures may
decide to require that only physicians administer artificial insemination.
If that is the case, decisions must be made as to what sanctions to im-
pose on those acting without a physician. Criminalizing the performance
of artificial insemination donor without medical supervision would be state
action, and could elicit the constitutional arguments of denial of equal
protection, which the state would have to rebut by establishing a com-
pelling state reason for its action.
Selecting the proper donor for artificial insemination is of paramount
United States, 300 New Eng. J. Med. 585, 585 (1979) ("Despite societal pressure discourag-
ing artificial insemination for single women, at least 9.5 percent of the respondents [physi-
cians] (36 of 379) have done so.").
42. Ronald W. Lewis, M.D., Tulane University Fertility Clinic, stated that on occasion
Tulane receives telephone requests from single women for artificial insemination. Tulane's
fertility program is limited to married couples, however. Tulane's program requires par-
ticipating couples to sign an informed consent form which states: "We represent that we
were legally married at (place, city and state)
on 19 and that we have co-habited
together as man and wife since that date." Lewis interview, supra note 33 (consent form
available from Tulane University Medical Center, 1415 Tulane Ave., New Orleans, Loui-
siana 70112). The Fertility Institute of New Orleans is also limited to married couples. Dickey
interview, supra note 33. LSU's consent form contained no written clause with regard to
marriage. Roniger interview, supra note 33.
43. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (recognizing the right to pro-
create as "fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.").
44. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
45. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). See also Md. Health & Gen. Code Ann. § 20-214 (1982) (stating
that neither an individual nor a hospital may be required to perform artificial insemination
and that such refusal will not result in either civil liability or disciplinary action).
46. 432 U.S. at 475.
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importance, not only to the recipient who may give birth to a defective
child, but also to the doctor performing the insemination if he is negligent
in the selection of the donor. Generally, as revealed in a study conducted
in 1978 which surveyed doctors listed by the American Fertility Society
as performing artificial insemination donor,' 7 the selection of a donor is
made not by the patient, but by the doctor. Most donors possess above
average intelligence and health and are either medical students, hospital
residents, or university students. 8 However, little further screening is con-
ducted. Although almost all the doctors performing artificial insemina-
tion donor do take a family history of donors, this is usually in the form
of presenting a check-list of familial diseases to the donor. 9 Since donors
are generally paid for their semen,5" the incentive to reveal a disqualify-
ing genetic history is not great. Although most doctors would reject a
47. Curie-Cohen, Luttrell & Shapiro, supra note 41, at 586 (471 doctors responded
to the study; 91.8 percent of those performing A.I.D. do not allow the recipients to select
the donors). See Or. Rev. Stat. § 677.360 (1981) ("Only physicians licensed under this chapter
and persons under their supervision may select and perform artificial insemination."). All
physicians interviewed were concerned with doing as careful a matching between the couple
and the donor as possible, including blood type. Dr. Lewis selects all of his donors per-
sonally. Dickey interview, supra note 33; Lewis interview, supra note 33; Roniger interview,
supra note 33.
48. Curie-Cohen, Luttrell & Shapiro, supra note 41, at 586 (Sixty-two percent of the
responding physicians used medical students or hospital residents; 10.5% used university
or grad students; 17.8% used both). Dr. Lewis stated that Tulane's donor pool was com-
prised of approximately 90% medical and graduate students in related medical fields. The
remaining 10% were chosen from the professional community. Lewis interview, supra note
33. Dr. Roniger, consistent with the Curie-Cohen, Luttrell & Shapiro study, stated that
the LSU donor pool was comprised 100% of students in either graduate, medical, or dental
school. Roniger interview, supra note 33.
49. Curie-Cohen, Luttrell & Shapiro, supra note 41, at 586. Tulane screens its donors
for any infections and does a semen analysis to check the sperm count and screen for syphilis.
Tulane's donor information form records such information as: name, address, phone number
and date enrolled; height, weight, eye and hair color; blood type and family diseases; sports,
art, and music; and a small section at the bottom to enter comments and the name of
the interviewer. On the reverse side, the form asks: "Has anyone in your family had any
of the following conditions? Please include those family members who may have died. Think
of your family as any brothers, sisters, father, mother, maternal and paternal aunts, uncles,
and grand parents." The form then lists eight congenital conditions and 28 adult condi-
tions. If there is an affirmative answer to any of the congenital or adult conditions the
donor is to state the specific relation, the conditions and the age affected. Tulane Universi-
ty Medical Center Fertility Clinic, Donor Screening Form (on file with Dr. Ronald W. Lewis,
M.D. Tulane University Medical Center Fertility Clinic, 1415 Tulane Ave., New Orleans,
Louisiana 70112). LSU does similar screening. If all of the information is negative and
the physical examination is normal, the donor brings in a semen analysis for an elaborate
culture specimen. Ethnic groups with genetic disorders particular to their group are screen-
ed for such disorders, e.g., black donors for sickle cell anemia and mediterranean donors
for thalassemia. Roniger interview, supra note 33.
50. Tulane pays their donors for the first donation and for each subsequent donation
until there is a successful pregnancy or the couple drops out. Lewis interview, supra note 33.
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donor with a negative genetic history, few physicians do any positive
screening. 5'
Legislators might consider the possibility of requiring certain genetic
tests prior to any insemination, or at least informing the recipients of
the availability of such testing.5 2 Such screening could range from testing
for communicable diseases to, in the case of a married couple, the match-
ing of physical appearance with the recipient husband.53
Although the problem of incest stemming from multiple children pro-
duced by the same donor may seem remote,5" it becomes more plausible
within ethnic groups and within the same community.55 Most doctors
studied reported no policies concerning the maximum use of a donor,56
although those who did, limited the use of a single donor to six or fewer
pregnancies. "
Noting the frequency of use of the same donor's semen necessitates
the keeping of records on donors. Although most doctors keep records
on the recipients, few retain them on the resulting children or donor. 8
51. Curie-Cohen, Luttrell & Shapiro, supra note 41, at 586. For example, although
94.7%V0 of the doctors surveyed in the study indicated they would reject a carrier of Tay-
Sachs disease, less than one percent of the doctors indicated they tested donors for carrier
status. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 677.370 (1981) ("No semen shall be donated for use in artificial
insemination by any person who: (1) has any disease or defect known to be transmissible
by genes; or (2) knows or has reason to know he has venereal disease."). One reason that
little actual genetic screening is done may be its expense, added to an already costly pro-
cedure. Initial screening costs $150.00 plus a $75.00 donor fee, and each subsequent in-
semination costs $75.00 plus a $50.00 donor fee. Usually a woman comes in for one to
two inseminations per cycle. The pregnancy rate for women without children is approx-
imately 5007o in the first six months, 75% after one year, and approximately 80 to 1000%0
pregnancy rate after one and a half years. The failure or drop-out rate ranges from 10
to 2007o. In depth genetic screening would add an additional $500.00 to $1,000.00 to the
cost. Lewis interview, supra note 33.
52. Banks That Aid Parenting, The Times-Picayune/The States Item, Mar. 14, 1981
§ 5, at 1, col. I (Dr. Cyris Milani reporting that he conducts genetic screening if recipients
wish to pay $40.00 or more).
53. Curie-Cohen, Luttrell & Shapiro, supra note 41, at 587, reveal that some matching
as to physical appearance occurs routinely and some only when requested. Dr. Lewis of
Tulane's Fertility Clinic states that his objective is to match the donor such that it is "im-
possible for society to tell that the child is not genetically of the couple." Lewis interview,
supra note 33. See also supra note 47.
54. Curie-Cohen, Luttrell & Shapiro, supra note 41, at 589.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 587. Of those who responded to the Curie-Cohen, Luttrell and Shapiro study,
8406 had no policies concerning maximum use.
57. Id. Dr. Lewis stated that Tulane preferred to limit the use of any particular donor
to one to three successful pregnancies because he wanted to avoid any chance of weakening
the genetic pool. He noted, however, that this could be difficult at times because often
there was little or no follow-up as to the success of the pregnancy when a patient was
a referral. Lewis interview, supra note 33. Likewise, LSU limits the number of pregnancies
per donor. Roniger interview, supra note 33.
58. Curie-Cohen, Luttrell & Shapiro, supra note 41, at 588. (92.2% of the physicians
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Legislation requiring such record keeping would likely be opposed on the
grounds of insuring the privacy of the parties and protecting the donor's
anonymity.59 However, a carefully drafted statute could require that records
be kept confidential with accessibility permitted only for cause, and even
then, only when medically necessary." °
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD
Surrogate motherhood is another alternative for those who cannot,
or choose not, to procreate in the traditional manner. The surrogate agrees
to be artificially inseminated, to carry any resulting fetus to birth, and
then to relinquish to the contributor of the sperm all rights and obliga-
tions to the child. Generally, the sperm is that of a married man whose
wife is infertile. 6' This procedure is somewhat analogous to artificial in-
semination donor in that the resulting child will be the biological off-
spring of one member of the infertile couple. Indeed, it is this similarity
which has been noted by proponents of surrogate motherhood, who claim
that prohibiting this procedure while sanctioning artificial insemination
is discrimination on the basis of sex.6" However, surrogate mothering in-
who responded kept records on the recipients, 36.9% kept records on the children born,
and 30.4% kept records on the donor).
59. Id. 82.6% of the responding physicians opposed any such legislation, as would
Dr. Roniger. Roniger interview, supra note 33. Note that although Dr. Lewis did not see
as much of a problem of keeping such records on "fresh donors," he did see a need for
legislation where frozen sperm banks were concerned. Lewis interview, supra note 33.
60. Compare Louisiana's statute requiring a written statement of family history to ac-
company acts of surrender in adoption.
A. Any person who executes an act of legal surrender . . . shall execute these
with a written statement. ...
B. [Containing] the following nonidentifying information if known:
(1) Ages of the biological parents.
(2) An explicit and extensive medical genetic history of the biological parents and
their immediate families.
C. [A] copy of said statement shall be included in the sealed adoption record.
La. R.S. 9:422.13 (Supp. 1984).
61. Not all surrogate contracts involve a married sperm donor. Compare California
Assembly Bill No. 3771, which would restrict surrogate contracts to use by infertile couples
only. ("Infertile Couple means a husband who is capable of producing viable sperm and
his wife who has been determined by a licensed physician to be incapable of conceiving
or carrying a child to term without significant risk to her life or who has been unable
to conceive for one year prior to the date of the execution of the contract."), Cal. A.B.
3771, 1981-1982 Reg. Sess., and the 1981 Michigan Bill which did not require the father
to be a married man ("If a single natural father has entered into a surrogate parenthood
agreement with a surrogate, that natural father, together with the surrogate, shall file a
petition to terminate the parental rights of the surrogate and to establish the paternity of
the natural father."). Mich. H.B. 5184 Reg. Sess (1981).
62. See Rushevsky, supra note 5, at 120 n.98 ("Surrogate intermediary Katie Brophy
has analogized the payment of fees to sperm donors to the payment of fees to surrogates
and concluded that the legal distinctions are 'very sexist.' "). Would the discrimination be
against the male who is not permitted to procreate this way, or against the surrogate who
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volves an added element not present in artificial insemination donor. For
in the latter, the sperm donor merely contributes genetic material, then
severs his relationship to any offspring, while a surrogate mother goes
on to nurture the fetus within her until birth.
63
Although not as common as artificial insemination donor is today,
the concept of surrogate motherhood is not new. The Bible records that
Sarah, unable to bear a child, directed Abraham to her hand-maiden,
Hagar, who later bore Abraham his son Ishmael." Surrogate motherhood
has gained popularity recently. 6 It is estimated that by the end of 1982,
one-hundred children were born of surrogate motherhood in the United
States.6 As a result of the increasing use of this method of reproduction,
a number of state legislatures have considered adopting laws regulating
the practice.6"
is not permitted to provide her services, or against the infertile couple who is denied the
chance to have a child so conceived?
63. The more appropriate analogy is between A.I.D. and ovum donation.
64. Now Sarai, Abram's wife, bore him no children. She had an Egyptian maid
whose name was Hagar. . .And Sarai said to Abram, 'Behold now, The Lord
has prevented me from bearing children; go unto my maid; it may be that I shall
obtain children by her'. . . And Hagar bore Abram a son, and Abram called
the name of his son Ishmael.
Genesis 16:1-2, 15. But note Krimmel, The Case Against Surrogate Parenting, 3 Hastings
Center Rep. 35, 36 (1983) (stating that Sarah actually had given Hagar to Abram as a
second wife and that Hagar did not relinquish Ishmael to Sarah; rather, after Sarah gave
birth to Isaac, she banished both Hagar and Ishmael).
65. Bird, Surrogate Motherhood: hers? yours? ours?, 2 Cal. Law. 20, 22 (Feb. 1982).
Note that in Kentucky there is a Surrogate Parenting Association, Inc.; in California, Sur-
rogate Parenting Foundation; and in Michigan, Surrogate Family Services, Inc. Maryland
and Arizona also have surrogate mother centers. There is even a newsletter for interested
persons. Robertson, Surrogate Mothers: Not So Novel After All, 13 Hastings Center Rep.
28, 28 (1983); Rushevsky, supra note 5, at 109. See also Pregnancy by Proxy, Newsweek,
July 7, 1980, at 72.
66. Surrogate Moms: State Law Should Be Brought in Line with Times, Detroit Free
Press, Feb. 13, 1983, at B2, col. 1; A Surrogate-Motherhood Nightmare, Atlanta Const.,
Jan. 31, 1983, at AI0, col. 2. Noel Keane, a Michigan attorney, states that he has arranged
23 surrogate births in the last seven years and 21 more women are currently pregnant in
his program. He is also working on surrogate arrangements for 30 other couples. For more
information, see N. Keane & D. Breo, The Surrogate Mother (1981).
67. Alaska H.B. 498, 1981 Reg. Sess.; Ariz. S.B. 1280, 36th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1983);
Cal. A.B. 3771, 1981-82 Reg. Sess.; Cal. A.B. 365, 1981-82 Reg. Sess.; La. S.B. 175, 1983
Reg. Sess.; La. S.B. 224, 1976 Reg. Sess.; Mich. H.B. 4114, H.B. 4178, H.B. 4179, 1983
Reg. Sess (Three bills in favor of surrogate regulation, introduced by Rep. Fitzpatrick, D-
Battle Creek, Mich., were defeated by a vote of approximately 80-85 of the 110 member
House); Mich. H.B. 4207, 1983 Reg. Sess.; Mich. HB. 5184, 1981 Reg. Sess.; Mich. S.B.
4207, 1983 Reg. Sess.; Mich. S.B. 63, 1983 Reg. Sess. (The latter bill, introduced by Senators
Binsfield, Arthurhurtz, DeGrow, Cruce, Gast, Engler, A. Cropsey & H. Cropsey, The Com-
mittee On Health and Social Services, passed the Senate and is currently pending in the
House. Telephone interview with Senator Binsfield's staff (Jan 31, 1984).); S. Car. H.B.
3491, 1982 Reg. Sess.; S. Car. H.B. 2098, 1982 Reg. Sess. Maryland and South Dakota
are two other states which have also introduced legislation concerning surrogate parenting.
FAMILY LA W
Aside from the obvious moral and psychological considerations deter-
ring the practice, surrogate motherhood is a financially costly 8 and poten-
tially illegal procedure. Additionally, with so many alternatives such as
surgical treatment for the infertile female69 or possibly in vitro fertilization"0
if the problem is blocked Fallopian tubes, or even embryo transplant,
surrogate motherhood really may be more of a last resort.
To date, not one state has a statute specifically sanctioning surrogate
contracts. 7' Other states have disapproved of the practice as evidenced
by proposed legislation,7" court cases, 3 and attorney general opinions."'
Avery, Surrogate Mothers: Center of New Storm, U.S. News & World Report, June 6,
1983, at 76.
68. Surrogate arrangements cost more than adoption and as much as six times more
than in vitro fertilization. The going rate is $10,000 to $15,000 for the surrogate mother
plus medical and other expenses plus attorney and broker fees. Fenly, "The Baby Broker":
California Psychologist Specializes in Arranging "Pregnancy by Proxy," The Times-
Picayune/The States Item, Aug. 26, 1982, § 5, at 9, cols. 3-5. See also Avery, supra note
67 (The total bill to the couple can run as high as $45,000.).
69. For explanation of new laser surgery techniques used to enhance the possibility
of pregnancy, see J. Bellina, J. Voros, A. Fick & J. Jackson, Management of Endometriosis
with the Carbon Dioxide Laser & Danazol (unpublished manuscript) (available from Omega
Institute Laser Research Foundation, 3439 Kabel Dr., New Orleans, La. 70114).
70. Dr. Lewis notes that surrogate mothering was a phenomenon which existed before
in vitro fertilization was a realistic alternative, and that the more readily available and
technologically feasible in vitro fertilization becomes, the more demand for surrogate
motherhood will decline and perhaps become obsolete. Lewis interview, supra note 33.
71. See supra note 67.
72. Mich. S.B. 63, 1983 Reg. Sess. (This bill passed the Senate and is pending in the
House. Telephone interview, supra note 67. Cf. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5103.17 (Page
1981) (prohibiting "any person or organization not licensed as a child placing agency from
(1) the solicit[ing] of a woman to become artificially inseminated with the sperm of
a man who remains anonymous to them for the purposes of the woman bearing children
and surrendering possession of the children and all parental rights to such men and their
spouses." La. S.B. 175, 1983 Reg. Sess. (proposing to make a third party guilty if he know-
ingly participates in the act of selling a child). Senator Newman, the author of the bill,
explained that "the bill will establish guidelines for parties to actions involving the selling
of unborn children, surrogate mothers, or adoptions. Senator Jefferson moved that Senate
bill 175 be reported favorable as amended, and without objections it was so reported."
Minutes of Meeting, La. Senate Comm. on Judiciary (May 24, 1983).
73. In re Baby Girl, 9 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2348 (1983) (Evidence that the mother
of a child was married and had contact with her husband created a conclusive presumption
that mother's husband was the father. Motion by mother and husband to terminate paren-
tal rights denied.); Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 122 Mich App. 506, 333 N.W.2d 90 (1983)
(Court ruled that it had no jurisdiction under the Michigan Paternity Act to establish con-
tracting father's biological link to a child conceived through a surrogate contract.); Doe
v. Kelley, 106 Mich App. 169, 307 N.W. 2d 438 (1981) (Appellate court properly granted
summary judgment where the plaintiffs contemplated entering into an agreement to pay
$5,000 plus medical expenses to a third party to have a child.). But see Kentucky v. Sur-
rogate Parenting Associates, Inc., 10 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1105 (1983) (Court ruled that
since the sperm donor in a surrogate arrangement already had a natural and legal relation-
ship with the child, the adoption statutes are not applicable and the proscription against
payment for adoption was not violated.).
74. Enforcement of Ohio Rev. Code § 5103.17, 83-0010 Ohio Op. Att'y Gen. (1983)
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One difficulty is that the surrogate mother agrees to give up any
resulting child for adoption by the natural father and his partner. This
has been noted as a difficulty in states which prohibit private adoptions,
except to stepparents or relatives.75 However, in support of the practice,
the argument may be made that the natural father is a relative and his
wife would be the analogous step-parent.76
Yet, even in states allowing private adoptions by non-relatives, the
validity of surrogate contracts is in question if these arrangements are
deemed against public policy.77 Some contend that such contracts are
detrimental to the family unit by injecting third parties into the private
marital sector of procreation, while others condemn the practice as one
which treats children like property and women like incubators subject to
economic coercion." Additionally, the agreement by a mother to surrender
custody of her child is considered by some as abandonment79 which may
("R.C. 5103.17 absolutely prohibits a person or group from acting to separate a child from
the child's parents, without reference to whom the child will be given."); Surrogate gesta-
tion contracts, 83-162 Okla Op. Att'y Gen. (1983); see also Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, §§
865-869 (West 1983) (prohibiting trafficking of children: "That one of the prospective adoptive
parents would also be a biological parent does not alter the fact that a surrogate agreement
interjects compensation in an adoption agreement beyond the expenses specified."). The
Louisiana Assistant Attorney General in a response to a question posed by Rep. Robert
R. Waddell stated that
R.S. 14:286, Sale of a minor child is not violated if the adopting parents pay
only actual parental care & living expenses of the surrogate mother and her ac-
tual living and medical expenses for thirty days after birth. There may be no
payment to a "middleman" or "broker" except for fees charged by licensed non-
profit adoption agencies.
Letter from Rene Saloman, Ass't Att'y Gen., on behalf of William J. Guste, Jr., Att'y
Gen., to Rep. Robert P. Waddell (Oct. 18, 1983) (Responding to Rep. Waddell's inquiry
whether surrogate arrangements would be in violation of La. R.S. 14:286-Sale of a Minor
Child). Surrogate motherhood contracts were declared illegal by Kentucky's Attorney General
in 7 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 2246 (1981) (Att'y Gen. Beshear asserted that surrogate motherhood
agreements were contrary to Kentucky's strong public policy against buying and selling
children.). But see Kentucky v. Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc., 10 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA)
1105 (1983).
75. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 45-63, 63a (1981); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 904 (1981); Ga.
Code Ann. § 19-8-3 (1982); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 210, § 2(A) (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981);
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 710.51 (West Supp. 1983-1984); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.22 (West
1982).
76. The Status of Ohio Law Relative to Surrogate Mother Arrangements: Report to
Members of Ohio Gen. Assembly (May 19, 1983).
77. See La. Civ Code art. 1895 (stipulating that contracts are not permitted if they
are contra bonos mores). The proposed Projet of Titles Ill and IV of Book Ill of the
Civil Code of Louisiana contains a similar provision. See La. State Law Inst., Revision
of Book 111, Titles IIl and IV of the Louisiana Civil Code art. 1968 (1983).
78. See generally Krimmel, supra note 64, at 35. See also Fenly, supra note 68, § 5,
at 9, col. I (Opponents at a "surrogates' seminar" held in December of 1981 accused potential
surrogates of hiring out their bodies and planning "premeditated abandonment.").
79. Fenly, supra note 68, § 5, at 9, col. I; Speed the Probe on Buying Babies, Toronto
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provide the basis for a tort suit on behalf of the surrendered child. 0
Proponents of surrogate contracts argue that couples have a constitu-
tionally protected right to privately arrange their procreation." Yet some
states may prosecute participants for adultery. 2 Even if that hurdle is
overcome, opponents insist that the right to procreate does not extend
protection to those who agree to accept payment for the carrying of a
child. "3 However, even if the agreement involves no compensation to the
surrogate, it may still raise legal issues when the contract is breached and
a party looks to the state for relief. In that case, the public policy argu-
ment could result in no relief to the aggrieved party.
4
a
However, even without a breach, surrogate contracts have been con-
demned as illegal-possibly as prostitution, but more commonly, as baby
buying. In many states, it is criminal to enter into contracts in which
money or other consideration is given in exchange for the surrendering
of a child.8" Exceptions are made for the payment of medical expenses
incurred by a natural mother who places her child for adoption." When
Star, Feb. 18, 1983, at 6, col. I ("[Wlhen the child is born and the surrogate mother ups
and leaves the hospital without it, the hospital authorities may-as they did in Metro's
first surrogate case last summer-claim that the baby has been abandoned and call the
Children's Aid Society.").
80. Rushevsky, supra note 5, at 127 & n.157 (citing Commonwealth ex rel. Teitelbaum
v. Teitelbaum, 160 Pa. Super. 286, 290, 50 A.2d 713, 715-16 (1947)).
81. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). See supra text accompanying notes
43-46.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
83. Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981).
84. In Louisiana, even if the arrangement was purely gratuitous and made with for-
mality, see La. Civ. Code art. 1773, a court might conclude that the cause is unlawful
if the enforcement of the cause were deemed contrary to moral conduct or public order.
La. Civ. Code art. 1895.
85. Rushevsky, supra note 5, at 112. n.39. The payment of the fee for use of the
body is the analogy.
86. Louisiana has such a provision, which provides in pertinent part:
A. Except as provided a by law, it shall be unlawful to sell or surrender a minor
child to another person for money or anything of value, or to receive a minor
child for such payment of money or anything of value.
La. R.S. 14:286(A) (West Supp. 1984). Cal. Penal Code § 273 (West 1970); Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 710.54 (West Supp. 1983-1984); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3107.10 (Page 1980);
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 866 (West 1983). See also Rushevsky, supra note 5, at 115 n.63,
(citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 126 (1979)); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-402 (1977); D.C. Code
Ann. §§ 32-782, 32-785 (1979); Fla. Stat. § 63.212 (1980); Iowa Code Ann. § 600.9 (West
1980); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 3 199.590 (Baldwin 1980).
87. La. R.S. 14:286(B) provides:
B. Nothing in this Section shall be construed to prohibit any person comtemplating
adopting a minor child, not yet born, from paying necessary, actual prenatal care
and living expenses of the mother of the minor child adopted, nor of paying
necessary, actual living and medical expenses of such mother or child for a
reasonable period of time, not to exceed thirty days, after the child is born.
See also statutes cited note 86 supra.
19841 1657
8LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the Michigan statute prohibiting such payment was recently challenged
on constitutional grounds, the Michigan court of appeals in Doe v. Kelley"8
upheld the statute, which the court said does not prohibit the having of
the child through the surrogate procedure, but which does preclude the
couple "from paying consideration in conjunction with their use of the
state's adoption procedures." 89 Similarly, attorney general opinions in
Oklahoma,9" Louisiana,9 and Kentucky" indicate that surrogate contracts
are violations of the baby buying or trafficking statutes. Despite the at-
torney general's opinion in the latter state, representatives of the Ken-
tucky corporation of Surrogate Family Services, Inc., contend that such
contracts may be upheld if the fee paid by a man to a woman who bears
his child is not to induce her to place the child for adoption, but instead
to secure her agreement to voluntarily terminate her parental rights to
the child.93 Additionally, it is argued by proponents of the surrogate con-
tracts that there is a big distinction between the sale of a black market
baby for which a troubled pregnant woman who never planned her
pregnancy is manipulated, and the deliberative decision of a surrogate
mother who willingly agrees to become impregnated in order to help an
infertile couple. 4
The fact that the surrogate agreement is reached prior to the child's
conception may involve another legal obstacle. For in some states, a parent
is prohibited from terminating parental rights to the child,9" or surrender-
ing the child for adoption 96 prior to the fifth day after the child's birth.
Another difficulty with surrogate contracts is that they usually in-
volve brokers who profit from the arrangements. For example, a Califor-
nia psychologist who specializes in arranging surrogate contracts estimates
the cost to an infertile couple at $20,000 to $30,000, depending on whether
the natural mother has health insurance. She acknowledges her cut to be
$9000, mostly to pay for psychological testing and legal fees. 97 The argu-
88. 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981).
89. Id. at 441.
90. Surrogate Gestation Contracts, 83-162 Okla.-Op. Att'y Gen. (1983).
91. Letter from Rene Soloman, Ass't Att'y Gen., on behalf of William F. Guste, Jr.,
Att'y Gen., to Rep. Robert R. Waddell (Oct. 18, 1983).
92. Surrogate Motherhood Contracts Declared Illegal by Kentucky A.G., 7 Fam. L.
Rep. (BNA) 2246 (1981).
93. Brophy, A Surrogate Mother Contract to Bear a Child, 20 J. Fam. L. 263, 264
(1981-1982).
94. Andrews, Removing the Stigma of Surrogate Motherhood, 4 Fan. Advoc. 21, 44
(Fall 1981).
95. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 199.500 (Baldwin 1982) (prohibiting an adoption when the
mother's consent is given before the fifth day after the child's birth).
96. La. R.S. 9:422.6 (Supp. 1984). See In re CDT, 415 So. 2d 315 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1982) (An act of surrender was deemed ineffective since it was executed prior to the child's
birth.).
97. Fenly, supra note 68, § 5, at 9, col. 1.
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ment is raised that the introduction of an intermediary alters the privacy
of the arrangement and weakens the parties' position of a constitutionally
guaranteed right.98 A recent Ohio attorney general's opinion99 has deemed
intermediaries, unlicensed by the Department of Public Welfare as place-
ment agencies pursuant to state statute, ' as prohibited by statute0 ' from
arranging surrogate contracts. Although not passed by the Louisiana House
of Representatives, a recent senate bill' 2 proposed to expand the crime
of surrendering minors to include as perpetrators not only those who sur-
rendered the child or paid for the surrendering, but also any person who
knowingly participates in the act of selling a child.' 3
Although opinions have been rendered on the illegality of surrogate
contracts under current laws, and although bills attempting to regulate
these agreements have been considered,' °4 no states have sanctioned,
outlawed or regulated the arrangements by specific legislation. Should a
state overcome public policy arguments which would prohibit these con-
tracts outright and decide to regulate them instead,' 5 a number of deci-
sions must be made. For example, who shall be eligible to enter into such
contracts? A South Carolina bill requires that the sperm donor be
married' 6 and that the surrogate have already given birth to at least one
child." A California bill requires that the recipients of the child prove
their infertility prior to being eligible to contract this arrangement.' 8 In
98. See Rushevsky, supra note 5, at 112.
99. Enforcement of Ohio Rev. Code § 5103.17, 83-001 Ohio Op. Att'y Gen. (1983).
100. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5103.03 (Page 1981).
101. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5103.17 (Page 1981).
102. La. S.B. 175, 1983 Reg. Sess.
103. Minutes of Meeting, Senate Comm. on Judiciary (May 24, 1983).
104. See supra note 67. A proposed Michigan anti-surrogate act, Mich. S.B. 63, 1983
Reg. Sess., is the only bill that is still alive. After having passed in the state senate, it
is still pending in the Michigan House of Representatives. All of the other bills introduced
in various states have been defeated.
105. For newspaper articles calling for legislation on surrogate motherhood, see Rejected:
An Absence of Legal Guidelines Leaves Surrogate Babies Adrift, Detroit Free Press, Jan.
25, 1983, at 6A, col. 1; Surrogate Moms: State Law Should Be Brought in Line with the
Times, Detroit Free Press, Feb. 13, 1983, at 2B, col. 1; Surrogate Bill a Necessity, Lansing
State Journal, Jan. 25, 1983, at 6A, col. 1, A Surrogate-Motherhood Nightmare, Atlanta
Const., Jan. 31, 1983, at 10A, col. 1; Babies for Sale, Greensboro News, Feb. 17, 1983,
at 1, col. 1; Law Must Protect Baby Doe, El Paso Times, Feb. 15, 1983; Speed the Probe
on Buying Babies, Toronto Star, Feb. 18, 1983.
106. S. Car. H.B. 2098 & H.B. 3409, 1982 Reg. Sess.
107. Id. This requirement is designed to minimize the occasions in which a surrogate
would want to keep the resulting child. The rationale is that a woman who has already
had a child will be more apt to understand the ramifications of, and have less psychological
problems with, surrendering the child after birth. It should be noted that the bill does not
require the surrogate to have had a live birth or living children. A married woman who
has experienced a still birth could conceivably have serious psychological problems in a
surrogate arrangement.
108. Cal. A.B. 3771, 1982 Reg. Sess.
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Michigan," 9 California,'"' and South Carolina,'' the bills require a full
psychological study of the potential recipients to ensure that the child will
ultimately be placed in a good home." 2 Although all of these provisions
may be rationalized as in the best interest of the child and thus compel-
ling, constitutional arguments might be raised by those prohibited from
participating. For example, the cohabiting couple who do not opt for
marriage may argue a denial of privacy in procreative matters. ' "
Not only must legislation trod entirely new ground in many areas,
it also must accommodate conflicts between the surrogate mother con-
cept and already existing law. For example, the legal presumption com-
mon in many states is that the husband of the mother is presumed to
be the father of any children born during a marriage.' 4 That presump-
tion must be overcome for the natural father in a surrogate arrangement
to be recognized as the legal father. Such was the conflict in two recent
cases involving surrogates. In Syrkowski v. Appleyard,' ' the parties entered
into a surrogate mother contract. Prior to the resulting child's birth,
109. The Michigan bill provides that:
A person who has a certificate of registration as a marriage counselor, a licensed
psychologist, a licensed physician who is a psychiatrist, or a qualified employee
of a licensed child placement agency has counseled the natural father and his
spouse on the consequences and responsibilities of surrogate parenthood and believes
that the natural father and his spouse both fully understand these consequences
and responsibilities, and are prepared, in the professional judgment of the person
or agency to assume these responsibilities.
Mich. H.B. 4114, 1983 Reg. Sess.
110. Cal. A.B. 3771, 1982 Reg. Sess. Section 7505 states in pertinent part: "(a) the
petition shall include . . . (b) evidence of the ability of the infertile couple to care for
the child... [including] (c)... a report recommending approval of the petitions has been
submitted by an agency approved by the court to conduct a home study of the infertile
couple." Note that the California bill requires review of the criminal record as well. Perhaps
such a clause was precipitated by a newspaper account which indicated that one child was
born to a woman who was inseminated with sperm from the California Nobel Sperm Bank.
The woman had lost custody of children of a previous marriage after her husband was
accused of child abuse, and both the woman and her husband had served federal prison
terms in connection with a scheme to use identity records of dead children and others to
secure credit cards and bank loans. Nobel-Sperm Bank Mother Lost Children Because of
Abuse, The Times-Picayune/The States Item, July 14, 1982, § 1, at 5, col. 1.
11l. Section 20-7-3670 of the South Carolina bill provides: "(A) upon filing of all pleadings
for surrogate adoption ,the court must order an investigation . . . (B) [which] must consider
(5) the mental & physical health of the wife and the natural father. . . . [D] the judge
must review the report prepared... [and if] the report recommends surrogate adoption ...
The judge, within ten days after receipt of the report, must enter an order certifying the
stability of the wife and the natural father..." S. Car. H.B. 2098, 1982 Reg. Sess.
112. This is analogous to the studies conducted on adoptive parents.
113. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
114. La. Civ. Code art. 184 provides that "the husband of the mother is presumed
to be the father of all children born or conceived during the marriage." For a general
discussion of the common law presumption of legitimacy, see Note, "Children Born of
the Marriage"-Res Judicata Effect on Later Support Proceedings, 45 Mo. L. Rev. 307 (1980).
115. 122 Mich App. 506, 333 N.W. 2d 90 (1983).
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Syrkowski filed a complaint requesting an order of filiation pursuant to
the Michigan Paternity Act' 6 and the entry of his name as natural father
on the child's birth certificate. Mrs. Appleyard admitted the allegations
and also requested an order of filiation. The Attorney General of Michigan
intervened, alleging that the circuit court had no jurisdiction over
Syrkowski's action under the Paternity Act since a "surrogate mother"
arrangement was involved. Instead, the Attorney General argued that Mr.
Appleyard was the legal father of the child since he consented to his wife's
artificial insemination.' 7 Syrkowski replied by submitting Mr. Appleyard's
revocation of consent to the insemination. Refusing to reach the issue
of whether surrogate mother contracts were against public policy, the ap-
pellate court concluded that the relief requested by Syrkowski was beyond
the scope of the Paternity Act and thus not within the court's
jurisdiction.''
A Kentucky circuit court in In re Baby Girl'9 similarly denied the
request of the husband of a surrogate mother who wished to terminate
parental rights and transfer custody of the child to the biological father.
Although the child had already been surrendered to the biological father
who had left the state, the court refused to recognize the biological father
as the legal father, rationalizing that a child born in wedlock was presumed
to be the legitimate child of the mother and her husband. Since the mother
was married and had been in contact with her husband during the possi-
ble time of conception, the presumption was deemed conclusive and could
not be overcome merely by an affidavit admitting the artificial insemina-
tion. Additionally, the court noted that, in violation of statute, no
application had been made to the Cabinet of Human Resources of Ken-
tucky for permission to place or receive the child for adoption. In Loui-
siana, any legislation sanctioning surrogate mother contracts would have
to accommodate Civil Code article 188 which prohibits the husband of
a mother from disavowing a child born as a result of artificial insemina-
tion to which he consented.
116. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 722.714(f) (1968) (Paternity Act); Mich. Comp. Laws
Ann. § 722.717(a) (filiation).
117. The Attorney General relied on Mich. Comp. Law Ann. § 333.2824(6) (1980), Mich.
Stat. Ann. § 14.15 (2824)(6), Mich. Comp. Law Ann. 700.111(2) (1980), and Mich. Stat.
Ann. 27.5111(2). Cf. La. Civ. Code art. 188 (precludes disavowal by the husband of a
child born to his wife as a result of artificial insemination to which he has consented).
118. The court noted:
We view the surrogate mother arrangements with caution as we approach an
unexplored area in the law which, without a doubt, can have a profound effect
on the lives of our people. The courts should not be called upon to enlarge the
scope of the Paternity Act to encompass circumstances never contemplated thereby.
Studied legislation is needed before surrogate arrangements are recognized as pro-
posed under the facts submitted herein.
122 Mich. App. 506, 515, 333 N.W.2d 90, 94 (1983).
119. 9 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 2348 (Ky. Cir. Ct., March 8, 1983).
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Once a state permits surrogate contracts, there still remains the task
of drafting a detailed contract that anticipates the myriad of possibilities. 2 '
Legislation could mandate standards for all such contracts. Basically, the
surrogate agrees to be inseminated by the donor's sperm, carry any
resulting child, and then surrender the child to the donor in exchange
for payment of medical expenses and a fee for the surrogate' 2 ' which
generally is between $5000 and $10,000. Maximum fees could be set by
state regulation.'22 Proposed legislation may also provide for lost wages
to the surrogate,'2 3 and the possible requirement that the sperm donor
post a bond in favor of the state securing support to the child should
the donor be unable to support the child for any unforeseen reason."2
Additionally, a donor might be required to name the child as beneficiary
on a life insurance policy as additional security for the child.' 2 5
A well drafted surrogate contract should anticipate remedies in the
event of a breach by one of the parties. For example, what if the sur-
rogate has sexual intercourse with her husband during the potential con-
ception period? Such was the case in the recently publicized case of Baby
120. For a suggested surrogate contract, see Brophy, supra note 93.
121. For a discussion of the tax ramifications related to the payment of a surrogate
fee, see Maule, Federal Tax Consequences of Surrogate Motherhood, 60 Taxes 656 (1982).
122. Mich. H.B. 5184, 1981 Reg. Sess., section 95: "The department shall establish ...
a maximum fee for compensation of a surrogate. The maximum fee shall be reviewed every
two years . . . [and] shall not be less than $10,000.00." The 1983 Michigan Bills did not
contain a maximum fee provision. See also S. Carolina's 1982 proposed legislation:
Prior to the entry of a final decree of surrogate adoption, the natural father and
his wife must file with the court a sworn statement describing money or other
consideration or thing of value paid to or exchanged by any party in the sur-
rogate adoption proceeding .... The court must approve or disapprove fees and
expenses. Acceptance or retention of amounts in excess of those approved by
the court constitutes a violation of this section.
S. Car. H.B. 2098, 1982 Reg. Sess.
123. Michigan's 1983 bill provided for payment of lost wages. "[A] written surrogate
parenthood agreement may contain . . . expenses incurred for . . . the surrogate's loss
of work time." Mich. H.B. 4114, 1982 Reg. Sess. This was a change from Rep. Fitzpatrick's
1981 proposed legislation which provided that payment of surrogate expenses "shall not
include any expenses for lost wages of the surrogate or other nonrelated incidentals, unless
specifically enumerated within the agreement." Mich. H.B. 5184, 1981 Reg. Sess. South
Carolina's House Bill 3491 and House Bill 2098, which appear to have been modeled after
Michigan's 1981 legislation, also do not provide for lost wages unless specifically enumerated
in the agreement. S. Car. H.B. 2098, & H.B. 3491, 1982 Reg. Sess.
124. Mich. H.B. 4114, 1983 Reg. Sess. ("[T]he natural father shall file a surety bond
• . . to indemnify this state for any cost up to $100,000.00 incurred by the state for the
care of a child born to a surrogate .... ").
125. Cal. A.B. 3771, 1982 Reg. Sess., § 7506 ("A contract approved . . . shall include,
but shall not be limited to . . . (d) The provision of term life and health insurance for
the surrogate and infertile couple for such term and in such amounts as shall be determined
by the parties to the contract."). See also Brophy, supra note 93, at 275 (contract provision
§ VII); Pregnancy by Proxy, Newsweek, July 7, 1980.
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Doe in Michigan,' 26 in which Mrs. Stifers, the surrogate mother, delivered
a microcephalic child. Blood tests confirmed that the child was that of
the surrogate and her husband, who had breached their agreement to
refrain from sexual intercourse during the period immediately prior to
her artificial insemination. The breach resulted in a suit by Malahoff,
the man contracting for the services. Malahoff sought $30,000 in damages
for breach of contract. Additionally, the Stifers indicated they were con-
templating suit against the doctor performing the insemination, 2 ' claiming
they followed the latter's instructions. In order to alleviate the possibil-
ity of a donor receiving a child who is not genetically his, the surrogate
contract should require blood tests and other necessary medical tests to
confirm the biological paternity of the child.' 28
Another problem area involves the care exercised by a surrogate dur-
ing her pregnancy. Contracts should stipulate restrictions as to smoking,
drinking, drug consumption, and strenuous activity, since all of these could
potentially affect the child. The question still remains as to the remedy
if the surrogate breaches the agreement. Should amniocentesis be required
to discover any defects?' 29 If the child is defective, the issue of causation
arises. If it could be proven that the surrogate contributed to the defect,
should the donor still be required to keep the child?'30
Assuming there is no question of a defect, but that the surrogate
mother changes her mind and decides to terminate her pregnancy, what
relief is available to the sperm donor? Since the services rendered by the
126. Baby Doe Goes Home, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1983, at 16, col. 1.
127. Id.
128. See Mich. H.B. 4114, § 8, 1983 Reg. Sess. ("(I) Not later than 24 hours after
the birth of a child born to a surrogate, the natural father, the surrogate, the surrogate's
husband if the surrogate is married, and the child shall submit to procedures necessary
for the performance of blood or tissue typing tests which tend to establish the paternity
of the child."). See also Brophy, supra note 93, at 274.
129. See Brophy, supra note 93. For example, Michigan Rep. Fitzpatrick's proposed
1983 bill requires the surrogate to agree to "reasonable medical instructions regarding her
prenatal health and the prenatal health of the fetus." But note that the "agreement shall
not be construed to require the surrogate to abort the fetus." Mich. H.B. 4114, 1983 Reg. Sess.
130. See Mich. H.B. 4114, 1983 Reg. Sess. (Section 4: "(1) A natural father and his
spouse shall assume, upon birth, all parental rights and responsibilities for a child, regardless
of the condition of the child.") (emphasis added). But note that the bill does provide that
the natural father may contest paternity by blood tests and tissue typing. In the event that
the court determines that the natural father is not the father of the child born to the sur-
rogate, "[tlhe surrogate's consent to the termination of her parental rights.., shall be
considered void, and the surrogate shall assume parental rights and responsibilities for the
child," Mich. H.B. 4114, 1983 Reg. Sess. These provisions were presumably included after
the controversy which arose out of the Baby Doe case. See supra text accompanying notes
126-27. See also Brophy, supra note 93, at 282 (section XXI: "The natural father assumes
the legal responsibility for any child who may possess congenital abnormalities and he has
been previously advised of the risk of such abnormalities.").
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surrogate are extremely personal in nature,' 3 and since the case of Roe
v. Wade'32 would protect the surrogate's right, absent waiver, to abort
during the first trimester of pregnancy, specific performance to carry the
child to term would not be available.' 33 However, the donor might be
able to obtain relief in the form of damages for infliction of mental
distress.
134
Likewise, if the surrogate carried the child to term, but decided to
keep it, no specific performance could be required. " ' A custody battle
would then result between the two natural parents, the surrogate and the
sperm donor. Although the father's position may be strengthened by re-
cent cases involving father's rights to illegitimates, 36 and joint custody
statutes,' 37 most courts would be reluctant to take a child of tender years
from the mother.'38
An even bigger problem might arise if the donor and the surrogate
refuse to take the child, either because the child is defective or the parties
simply change their minds. Although the child might be financially secure
if the donor is required to support the child or if the donor has executed
a bond' 9 or life insurance policy'4 ° in favor of the infant, no legislation
could alleviate the potential damage to the unwanted child who would
not be welcomed by either parent.
Although attempting to accommodate for these potential problems
may tempt legislatures to completely outlaw surrogate contracts, two ma-
jor deterrents to this approach exist. First is the cited constitutional ques-
131. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 341 (1981).
132. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
133. But see Cal. A.B. 3771, 1982 Reg. Sess. (section 7511: "Upon breach of contract
that is subject of a petition approved pursuant to this part the court may grant such legal
and equitable relief as it deems appropriate, including specific performance.") (emphasis
added).
134. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965).
135. See supra notes 131 & 133.
136. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
137. La. Civ. Code art. 245, as added by 1983 La. Acts, No. 215, § I (effective Sept.
1, 1983):
In a proceeding where custody of an illegitimate child formally acknowledged
by both parents is sought by both parents, and in proceedings for change of custody
after an original award, custody shall be awarded in accordance with Article 146.
For purposes of this article, any reference in Article 146 to children of the mar-
riage shall be deemed to apply to an illegitimate child formally acknowledged
by both parents.
138. Fulco v. Fulco, 259 La. 1122, 254 So. 2d 603 (1971) (legislatively superseded by
La. Civ. Code art. 157); Suire v. Jagneaux, 422 So. 2d 572 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1982);
Deese v. Deese, 387 So. 2d 671 (La. App 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 So. 2d 740 (La. 1980);
Meyers v. Meyers, 324 So. 2d 562 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975), writ. not considered, 329 So.
2d 453 (La. 1976).
139. See provision in Michigan House Bill 4114, supra note 124.
140. See supra note 125.
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tion involving the analogy of the process to artificial insemination donor.
Second is the argument that the arrangements will go underground, leav-
ing even less protection for the parties and, most importantly, for the
resulting child.
IN VITRO FERTILIZATION
The birth of Louise Brown in England on July 25, 1978 awakened
the world to a new human procreative possibility-in vitro fertilization,
or conception outside of the mother's body."' Shortly thereafter, in vitro
clinics were established in Norfolk, Virginia and in Australia," 2 the former
of which announced the birth of the first in vitro baby in the United
States on December 28, 1981.'"1 By the end of 1982, about twenty clinics
in the world were capable of in vitro fertilization.'4 4 Although there is
only one such clinic currently operating in Louisiana,' it is anticipated
141. See P. Soupart, Present and Possible Future Research in the Use of Human Em-
bryos: Abortion and the Status of the Fetus 67 (1983) (July 25, 1978, Oldham, England-
first in vitro fertilization birth (girl); Oct. 3, 1978, Calcutta, India-second birth (girl), similar
procedure with one more technical step (cryopreservation); Jan. 14, 1979, Glasgow, Scotland-
third birth (boy) (most significant academic birth because birth of a male rules outpossibility
of accidental activation of human ovum, possible due to extra-corporeal manipulations);
June 23, 1980, Melbourne, Australia-fourth birth (girl)).
142. See Comment, In Vitro Fertilization: New Territory For the Preconception Tort,
5 GMU L. Rev. 169, 169 (1982); R. Dickey, S. Taylor, D. Curole & B. Bordson, The
First In Vitro Fertilization Pregnancy in Louisiana (1983) (unpublished manuscript) (available
from The Fertility Institute of New Orleans, Suite 118, 9830 Lake Forest Blvd., New Orleans,
Louisiana 70127).
143. Annas & Elias, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: Medicolegal Aspects
of a New Technique to Create a Family, 17 Fam. L.Q. 199, 202 (1983).
144. These include several clinics in England; two clinics in Melbourne, Australia-
Monash University & Royal Women's Hospital; one team in Vienna, Austria; two teams
in Paris, France; three in Germany; one in Holland. The U.S. teams include: two in California,
two in Texas, one in Connecticut and one in Virginia. Machol, In Vitro Fertilization: The
Work Continues, 19 Contemporary OB/GYN 40, 40 (1982). See also Center in Chicago
is Midwest's First for Test-tube Babies, The Times-Picayune/The States Item, Dec. 22, 1982
§ 1, at 16, col. I (Chicago's Mount Sinai Hospital); Double-Header is Reported by test-tube
clinic, The Times Picayune/The States Item, Sept. 1, 1982, § 1, at 6, col. I (citing among
those previously mentioned, Vanderbilt University, University of Oklahoma at Tulsa, and
Hillcrest Medical Center clinics). Since 1982 other clinics have opened in the United States,
notably including one in Louisiana. See infra note 146. For other new in vitro clinics, see
In New Haven, a New Kind of Baby Boom, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1983, § 23, at 2, col.
I (Yale, New Haven, Conn.); State's First In Vitro Clinic Opens, N.Y. Times, May 8,
1983, § 6, at 1, col. I (Middlesex General-University of Medicine, New Jersey).
145. An application for a certificate of need was made to the Louisiana Division of
Health Planning and Development, Department of Health and Human Resources, in December
of 1982 to construct facilities for in vitro fertilization at Pendleton Memorial Hospital in
New Orleans to operate in conjunction with the privately owned Fertility Institute of New
Orleans. After approval was received on January 3, 1983, construction of facilities began
in April of 1983. R. Dickey, S. Taylor, D. Curole & B. Bordson, supra note 142, at 1.
See also Woman Is First in State to Carry Test-Tube Baby, The Times-Picayune/The States
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that more in vitro facilities will be available in New Orleans shortly. 146
The in vitro process involves the surgical removal of one or more
human eggs or oocytes from the mother's ovary by placing a small needle
into the egg follicle. 4 7 The egg is then placed in a culture medium for
nourishing and subsequently fertilized by sperm in a petri dish.' 4 8 For
several days, the fertilized egg remains in incubation in an environment
simulating the mother's womb and when it reaches the eight cell embryo
or blastocyst stage, coinciding with the normal time of implantation, it
is transferred into the mother.
One of the major reasons for considering in vitro fertilization is to
bypass damaged or blocked Fallopian tubes, the latter being the cause
of sterility in forty to fifty percent of all infertile women. 49 Without
removing the egg and allowing it to be fertilized outside of the mother's
body, no pregnancy could occur, since the ripe egg would never be able
to pass through the blocked tubes to the uterus where it could unite with
sperm for fertilization. Although microsurgical techniques may be used
Item, Sept. 27, 1983, § 1, at 13, col. I. But note that the first 'test-tube' baby born in
Louisiana was conceived through Baylor University's Program in Houston, Texas; State's
First Test-Tube Baby Born, The Times-Picayune/The States Item, Mar. 11, 1984, § 1, at
20, col. 3.
146. Dickey interview, supra note 33. Both Tulane, under the direction of Ian H.
Thorneycroft, Ph.D., M.D., and Louisiana State University Medical School, anticipate opening
in vitro fertilization clinics in the near future. Lewis interview, supra note 33; Roniger inter-
view, supra note 33.
147. Patient Information: In Vitro Fertilization & Embryo Transfer Program-Baylor
College of Medicine & St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital (available from Baylor IVFET Pro-
gram, Dep't of Obstetrics & Gynocology, Baylor College of Medicine, 1200 Moursund Ave,
Houston, Texas 77030). [hereinafter cited as Baylor Patient Information]. See also R. Dickey,
S. Taylor, D. Curole & B. Bordson, supra note 142, at 3. Although the process may be
done vaginally, Doctor Unveils Another New First in "Test-tube" Fertilization Techniques,
The Times-Picayune/The States Item, Sept. 4, 1982, § 2, at 2, col. 1, the surgical removal
is more common and is considered safer. Dickey interview, supra note 33. The mother is
placed under general anesthesia and a laparoscopy is performed. The latter involves an inci-
sion in the patient's abdomen and the insertion of a magnifying instrument, or laparoscope,
which permits the surgeon to better view the reproductive organs. For more information
concerning oocyte harvesting, see Machol, supra note 144, at 40-51; see also Lopata, Johnston,
Hoult & Speirs, Pregnancy Following Intrauterine Implantation of an Embryo Obtained
by In Vitro Fertilization of a Preovulatory Egg, 33 Fertility & Sterility 117 (1980) (pro-
viding a detailed description of the actual technique used which resulted in the birth of
Candice Elizabeth Reed in Australia, June 23, 1980).
148. Biggers, In Vitro Fertilization, Embryo Culture and Embryo Transfer in the Human,
in Ethics Advisory Board, Appendix, supra note 21, § 8 at 2; see also, R. Dickey, S. Taylor,
D. Curole & B. Bordson, supra note 142, at 4. The term "test-tube" baby is a misnomer
in that although the egg that is removed is first placed in a test-tube to transport it from
operating room to the laboratory, the actual conception takes place in the petri dish where
the sperm are introduced into the process.
149. Biggers, supra note 148, at 35; Soupart, supra note 141, at 68.
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to restore Fallopian tubes, that process involves a risk of ectopic
pregnancies. 110
Another reason for considering in vitro fertilization is that the male
partner may have a low sperm count. Generally, a man is considered
oligospermic if he has fewer than twenty million sperm per milliliter.'5 '
Since a number of sperm may be lost in the trip from the vagina to the
uterus, the placement of sperm in direct contract with the egg in a petri
dish enhances the chance of fertilization.
The medical, ethical, and legal ramifications of in vitro fertilization
were considered carefully by the Ethics Advisory Board, a Board created
on recommendation of the National Commission for the Protection of
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research.' 52 In response
to a request for federal funding of a study of in vitro fertilization by
Dr. Pierre Soupart of Vanderbilt University in 1977," the Board con-
ducted a year and a half study, culminating in a report to the Secretary
of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.' The report ap-
proved of federal funding of the process as long as embryos which were
not transferred back into the mother's womb were not sustained any longer
than fourteen days after fertilization and that embryo transfer only be
attempted with gametes obtained from lawfully married couples.5 '
Added to misgivings about the unnatural aspect of in vitro
fertilization' 6 are concerns about the protection of any resulting fertil-
ized eggs and when that protection begins. Related to the complicated
question of when life begins, the attitudes concerning regulation of in
vitro fertilization are extremely diverse. If life begins at conception,' then
150. Soupart, supra note 141, at 69. Dickey interview, supra note 33. J. Bellina, J.
Voros, A. Fick & J. Jackson, supra note 69 (In cases of mild-to-moderate and severe-to-
extreme, post operatively there was a 307o ectopic pregnancy rate.).
151. Short, supra note 21; Mishell, State of the Art-What Can We Offer Patients?,
20 Contemporary OB/GYN 219 (1982).
152. For a discussion of the Ethics Advisory Board's role, see generally Lorio, In Vitro
Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: Fertile Areas for Litigation, 35 Sw. L.J. 973, 984-85 (1982).
153. Id. at 977.
154. Id. at 985 (citing Ethics Advisory Board, U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare,
Report and Conclusions: HEW Support of Research Involving Human In Vitro Fertiliza-
tion & Embryo Transfer 107 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Ethics Advisory Board, Conclusions.]).
155. Id. Secretary Harris left office without approving of the process, and the Ethics
Advisory Board has since been disbanded. Robertson, supra note 1, at 426 n.58.
156. Kass, Making Babies-The New Biology and the Old Morality, 26 Pub. Interest,
at 32 (Winter 1972).
157. See generally Lorio, supra note 152, at 979-80 (discussing how the various religious
denominations view the practice of in vitro fertilization). See also Vatican Is Frowning on
Test-Tube Babies, N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1982, at 3, col. 1. The proposal for the in vitro
clinic in New Orleans was submitted to the Catholic Archdiocese. Although no written ap-
proval was received, Dr. Dickey reports that the Archdiocese deemed the program "com-
patible with their own feelings" and "permissible." Television interview with Richard P.
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no egg should be injured or destroyed once fertilized. This mandates that
any egg removed in the in vitro process and fertilized be returned to the
mother's body after maturing to blastocyst stage. This raises doubt con-
cerning a technique used by some physicians in order to enhance the
possibilities of pregnancy. By administering hormones to the mother,
superovulation, or the production of more than one mature egg during
any menstrual cycle, results. If all the mature eggs are fertilized (multiple
fertilization), serious problems arise when there are too many eggs to
transplant back into the mother. Since the mother could only successfully
carry a certain number of fetuses to term, '58 the remaining fertilized eggs
must either be frozen or destroyed. To remove too many eggs in an at-
tempt to enhance the chances of pregnancy is thus arguably callous to
the potential conceptus.
Even if conception is not regarded as the beginning of life, there is
general agreement that a fertilized egg is human in origin and due some
protection although not necessarily the same protection provided for
persons.' 59 One difficulty here is that federal regulations relating to fetal
research' 60 define the fetus as "the product of conception from the time
of implantation." 6 ' Additionally, most state statutes regulating fetal ex-
perimentation appear to apply only to fetuses beyond the blastocyst
stage. 62 Therefore, there is a void in regulation for the period between
fertilization and transferral of the embryo to the carrier's uterus for
implantation.
Dickey, M.D., at Pendleton Memorial Methodist Hospital, New Orleans, Louisiana (Feb.
19, 1984) (available from Channel 6, News-Watch/Newsmaker, 520 Royal St., New Orleans,
La. 70130).
158. Dr. Dickey only removes three to four eggs and reimplants every egg that is removed.
Dickey interview, supra note 33. See also P. Dickey, S. Taylor, D. Curole & B. Bordson,
supra note 142, at 4; Woman First in State to Carry Test-Tube Baby, The Times-Picayune/The
States Item, Sept. 27, 1983, § 1, at 13, col. 1; Lorio, supra note 152, at 978 n.44. Dr.
Martin Quigley of the Houston in vitro project stated that he removes only two eggs from
the mother, and if both are successfully fertilized, both are reimplanted. Telephone inter-
view with Martin Quigley, M.D. (Sept. 23, 1981).
159. Kass, Ethical Issues in Human In Vitro Fertilization, Embryo Culture and Research,
and Embryo Transfer, Ethics Advisory Board Appendix, supra note 21, § 2, at 6. Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (stating that "person" does not include the unborn).
160. 45 C.F.R. § 46.201-211 (1983).
161. Id. Definition of Fetus is found at § 46.203(c).
162. It is unclear in most state statutes regulating federal experimentation whether the
statutes are meant to protect ex utero blastocysts. Flannery, Weisman, Braverman & Lipsett,
Legal Issues, in Ethics Advisory Board, Appendix, supra note 21, at 6. The following states
have statutes dealing with fetal experimentation: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 36-2301 to 36-2303
(West Supp. 1983-1984); Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 82-434 to 82-442 (1976 & Supp 1983); Cal.
Health & Safety Code § 25956-25957 (West Supp. 1984); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, §§ 81-26
(Supp. 1983-1984); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-1-58.5-6 (West 1979); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 436.026
(Bobbs-Merrill 1975); La. R.S. 40:1299.35.13, 40:1299.35.18 (Supp. 1984) La. R.S. 14:87.2
(1974); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22 § 1593 (1981); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 112, § 12 J
(Michie/Law. Co-op. 1984); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 333.2685 - 333.2692 (1980); Miss.
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Another problem arises if eggs are removed and fertilized with every
intention of returning them to the mother, but are unable to be transfer-
red due to the mother's death or some other unforeseen difficulty.' 63
Although these fertilized eggs could be frozen for a period, the question
remains as to where they should be implanted. One possibility is embryo
transfer to a different woman.164 However, besides the myriad of ethical
ramifications, the problem of finding a willing and suitable carrier exists.
The Illinois Abortion Law of 1975, as amended, does have an in vitro
provision which states that "[any] person who intentionally causes the
fertilization of a human ovum by a human sperm outside the body of
a living human female shall, with regard to the human being thereby pro-
duced, be deemed to have the care and custody of a child for purposes
of section 4 of the Act to Prevent and Punish Wrongs to Children."' 65
The statute defines human being as "the individual from fertilization until
death,"'166 and the law is not to be construed to apply to "participa-
tion in the performance of a lawful pregnancy termination."' 67 The con-
stitutionality of the statute was challenged by an infertile married couple
wishing to conceive by in vitro fertilization, and by the wife's gynecologist,
in the case of Smith v. Hartigan.' 6 8 Due to irreversibly damaged Fallo-
pian tubes, Mrs. Smith was unable to conceive naturally. She was advis-
ed by Dr. Lifchez that her only alternative was in vitro fertilization.
Although he stood ready and willing to aid in the process, he refused
due to his perception that the Illinois statute prohibited the activity. Lif-
chez noted that he would not implant a defective conceptus since it would
not survive, but most likely sponteneaously abort. Plaintiffs' contentions
Code Ann. §§ 41-39-1 to 41-39-3. (1981); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 188.037 (1983); Mont. Code
Ann. §§ 50-20-108, 50-20-112 (1983); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-342, 28-346 (1979); N.M. Stat.
Ann. §§ 24-9A-1 to -7 (1981); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.2-01 to -02 (1981); Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 2919.14 (Page 1982); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 63, § 1-735 (West 1984); Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit. 18, § 3216 (Purdon 1983); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 3216 (Purdon 1984); R.I.
Gen. Laws §§ 11-54-1 to 11-54-2 (Supp. 1981); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 34-23A-17 (1977);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-4-208 (1982); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-7-310, 76-7-311 (1978); Vt.
Stat. Ann. tit. 18, §§ 5224-5225 (Supp. 1982); Wyo. Stat. § 35-6-115 (1977). But see Ill.
Rev. Stat. ch. 38, §§ 81-21 to 81-31 (West Supp. 1983-1984).
163. Dr. Dickey states that not only does he return all eggs back to the woman's womb,
but also he does so as soon as possible, when the ovum has grown to a two to sixteen
cell size. Dickey interview, supra note 33; Woman's First in State to Carry Test-Tube Baby,
The Times-Picayune/The States-Item, Sept 27, 1983, § 1, at 13, col. 1.
164. Embryo "Donation" Criticized, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1982, § 1, at 17, col. 1.
To this author's knowledge, no mechanical incubator has been devised which could carry
a child to term.
165. IlI. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 81-26(f) (West Supp. 1983-1984). See also Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 18, § 3213(e) (Purdon 1983) (requiring all persons "conducting or experimenting in in
vitro fertilization" to file quarterly reports with the Department of Health.).
166. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 81-22(8) (West Supp. 1983-1984).
167. II. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 81-26(7) (West Supp. 1983-1984).
168. 556 F. Supp. 157 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
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that they were being deprived of their fundamental right to privacy and
that the statute was vague in not specifying whose conduct was
prohibited'69 were met by the Attorney General's reply that the statute
was not meant to prohibit in vitro fertilization. As interpreted by the At-
torney General and adopted by the court in its opinion, the provision
was designed to prohibit "the wilful exposure of embryos to harm, [such]
as by destructive laboratory experimentation."' 70 Additionally, the defen-
dants argued that the duty ceased upon reimplantation of the conceptus.
The exception for termination of lawful pregnancy was cited as support
for the propriety of the doctor's decision not to reimplant a defective
embryo.' 7 ' Although the court noted that the only potential issue raised
related to the technique of superovulation and and subsequent multiple
fertilizations,' 72 the plantiffs did not indicate that the procedure would
be conducted in that manner. Thus, the court denied the plantiffs' mo-
tions for injunctive relief, dismissing the action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
Just as surrogate motherhood raises a number of contractual dilem-
mas, in vitro fertilization, being a delicate procedure, raises tort ques-
tions. As early as 1978, the issue of wrongful termination of an in vitro
procedure was litigated in Del Zio v. Manhattan's Columbia Presbyterian
Medical Center.'73 After fertilization, but prior to implantation, the
resulting specimen was destroyed by the chief of obstetrics and gynecology
at Manhattan without the consent of the gamete donors. The destruction
was intentional because the doctor claimed that the procedure was not
properly conducted and implantation would result in the mother contract-
ing peritonitis, a potentially fatal disease.' 7' Treating the case more as
a property loss than wrongful death action,' 75 a jury awarded Mrs. Del
Zio $50,000 for emotional distress suffered, with nominal damages to the
husband for his loss. 76
Actually, most states would probably respond similarly since relief
in wrongful death has traditionally been awarded only for viable or quick
fetuses.' 7 Interestingly, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Danos v. St.
169. The plaintiffs noted the "team" nature of the process. Id. at 160.
170. Id. at 161 (citing Defendant's memorandum at 9).
171. Defendants contended that "to determine that [a] five-to-seven day old, non-viable
conceptus should not be reimplanted for any medical reason whatsoever is simply to par-
ticipate in a lawful pregnancy termination." Id. at 161 (citing Defendant's Memorandum
at 26).
172. Id. at 163.
173. No. 74-3588 (S.D.N.Y., filed Apr. 12, 1978).
174. Test-Tube Bereavement, Newsweek, July 31, 1978, at 70.
175. Katz, Legal Implications of In Vitro Fertilization and Its Regulation, in Ethics Ad-
visory Board, Appendix, supra note 21, § 9, at 27.
176. 44 Fed. Reg. 35,033, 35,050 (1979).
177. See Lorio, supra note 152, at 998 nn.196 & 197. See also Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65
F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
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Pierre' did not discuss quickness or viability in its recognition of a cause
of action for wrongful death of a six month fetus due to prenatal injury.
However, it is questionable whether Louisiana courts would be receptive
to wrongful death actions for the loss of an eight-cell blastocyst.
Should there be a live child born defective due to negligence in the
performance of the in vitro procedure, it is possible that courts might
entertain the child's action for relief due to those prenatal injuries.' Since
recent cases have allowed such relief even in preconception torts,'80 it is
not unreasonable to expect relief when the negligence occurred after con-
ception, even if prior to implantation.
The in vitro child born defective could also claim he or she is due
relief under the concept of wrongful life. The argument is not that the
in vitro procedure caused the defect, but that the doctor neglected to test
for defects or failed to discover a problem soon enough for the parents
to make a decision as to whether to continue with the process. After prov-
ing the existence of a duty owed, its breach, and the causation of the
injury, the plaintiff in a wrongful life action has the difficult task of prov-
ing the extent of damages, that is, how much more valuable it would
be to have never existed.' 8 ' Although states have not been favorably dis-
posed to the theory that an absence of life is preferable to a life of
deformity,'82 there recently has been a breakthrough.
The California case of Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories'83 enter-
tained a wrongful life action against a medical testing laboratory for im-
properly performed genetic testing. The court recognized a right by the
resulting child born with Tay-Sachs disease to claim damages for pain
178. 402 So. 2d 633 (La.- 1981).
179. Every state allows recovery by a child for prenatal injuries. W. Prosser, Handbook
of the Law of Torts § 55 (4th ed. 1971).
180. See Bergstreser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22, 25 (8th Cir. 1978) (recovery to infant
for brain damages resulting from negligently performed caesarian section on mother prior
to conception); Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973)
(recognizing a cause of action against pharmaceutical company that manufactured pills taken
by the mother prior to conception and allegedly altered chromosomal structure resulting
in the birth of mongoloid twins); Lazevnick v. Monroe County General Hosp., 499 F. Supp.
146 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (allowing plaintiffs to maintain their cause of action for damages where
daughter was born with brain damage and partial paralysis due to hospital lab technician's
negligent blood typing); Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250
(1977) (sustaining cause of action sustained against the hospital and doctor for negligently
performed transfusion prior to conception). But see Albala v. City of New York, 54 N.Y.2d
269, 270, 429 N.E.2d 786, 787, 445 N.Y.S.2d 108, 109 (1981) (Court affirmed defendant's
motion for summary judgment and stated that there was "no such action [as preconception
negligence] . . . cognizable under our [New York] law.").
181. For a more through discussion of wrongful life actions, see Lorio, supra note 152,
at 1001-04.
182. Actions for wrongful life and wrongful conception are specifically prohibited by
statute in South Dakota. S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 21-55-1 (Smith Supp. 1983).
183. 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980).
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and suffering to be endured during his lifetime and for pecuniary loss
resulting from impaired functioning due to the disease.' 84 Similarly, a
federal district court in Texas granted relief to a child born defective due
to the mother having contracted German measles during her pregnancy. '85
The defendant doctors who had failed to test the mother for the pregnancy
when she had the measles were held liable for the child care and treat-
ment, pain and suffering, and lack of potential employability. '86
Parents of a defective in vitro child might also seek relief in the form
of a wrongful birth action.' 87 Again, the claim is not that the physician
caused the deformity, but that his negligence in testing or informing parents
of the problem deprived the parents of the choice as to whether to em-
bark on the in vitro procedure, or if already begun, whether to continue
it. With Roe v. Wade's recognition of the right of a mother to terminate
her pregnancy in the early stages, the public policy argument against abor-
tion weakened. More courts began recognizing the parents' right to main-
tain wrongful life actions, even when similar wrongful birth actions on
behalf of the child had been rejected.'88
EMBRYO TRANSFER
On February 3, 1984, Dr. John E. Buster of Harbor-U.C.L.A. Medical
Center announced the first human birth resulting from embryo transfer."'
The baby born to a woman in her thirties who had been treated for in-
fertility was genetically that of the woman's husband and an egg donor.
The process of embryo transplant involves the transfer of a fertilized
egg into a womb. The initial fertilization could be performed in vivo-
through either sexual intercourse or artificial insemination-or in vitro.
If the fertilization occurs in vivo, the fertilized egg is removed from the
donor's uterus after five days when it consists of approximately eighty
to one hundred cells. The removal is by lavage, or "washing out," of
the donor's uterus. 90
184. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 831, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489-90.
185. Scales v. United States, No. A-79-CA-70 (W.D. Tex., filed June 9, 1981, amended
June 12, 1981), rev'd, 685 F. 2d 970 (5th Cir. 1982).
186. Id. The case was reversed by the Fifth Circuit on jurisdictional grounds. The Fifth
Circuit found that the child's claim was barred as a matter of law by the Feres doctrine
which prohibits lawsuits brought by servicemen under the Federal Tort Claims Act when
the injuries involved in the law suit arise out of activities incident to military services. 685
F.2d at 971.
187. For a more thorough explanation of wrongful birth actions, see Lorio, supra note
152, at 1005-08.
188. See the consolidated cases of Becker v. Schwartz and Park v. Chessin, 46 N.Y.2d
401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
189. Success is Born for Embryo Transplant, The Times-Picayune/The States Item, Feb
4, 1984, § 3, at 15, col. I.
190. Brotman, Human Embryo Transplants, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1984, § 6 (Magazine),
at 42; Soupart, supra note 141, at 75.
1672 [Vol. 44
FAMILY LA W
A number of various uses for embryo transfer have been contemplated.
If a woman is unable to ovulate, or produces eggs which carry
chromosomal defects, she could avail herself of embryo transfer and still
experience pregnancy and childbirth. She could actually carry her hus-
band's child, although she herself did not contribute the egg. Conversely,
a woman who had no difficulty producing healthy eggs, but who either
could not carry a child for medical reasons or chose not to do so for
personal reasons, 9 ' could have her fertilized egg transferred to a carrier
until birth.
It has been suggest that this "prenatal adoption'' 92 would provide
another option to women who were pregnant with an unwanted child.
The woman who did want to carry the child to term would no longer
have to abort, but could surrender the embryo to a willing carrier. The
problem with this theory is that timing of the two women's cycles is so
critical. Yet, with our computer age, available carriers could be kept "ready
and waiting," or failing that, embryos could be frozen until a suitable
carrier became available. The resulting child would be genetically that of
the egg donor.
The legal problems raised by these combinations are analogous to those
involving artificial insemination donor, and surrogate mother contracts.
The first example of embryo transfer, in which an egg donated by a third
party is fertilized, is quite similar to artificial insemination donor, but
with a reversal of sex roles. The donation in this instance is that of an
ovum, rather than of sperm. Just as with an artificial insemination donor,
the genetic combination of a husband's sperm with a third-party donor's
egg may be claimed to be adultery. However, using the artificial insemina-
tion donor model, this would not be adulterous unless the combination
was achieved through sexual intercourse.' 3
The question of parentage differs somewhat from that in artificial
insemination donor due to the nature of the donations made by the par-
ties. Whereas the male only contributes a gamete to the reproductive pro-
cess, the female's contribution is that of both egg and womb. Legislation
similar to artificial insemination donor statutes could sever the egg donor's
duties and rights to the child after the embryo is removed from her body, '
and the child could be deemed the carrier's child. Indeed, it is arguable
191. A great deal of controversy has arisen surrounding this motivation. The argument
is made that a woman who chooses not to carry a child purely because it is inconvenient
should not be permitted to avail herself of the process.
192. See British Study Embryo Banks, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1982, § I at 26, col. 6.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 24 & 25.
194. E.g., Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.239 (1981) ("(1) such donor shall have no right, obliga-
tion or interest with respect to a child born as a result of the artificial insemination; and
(2) a child born as the result of the artificial insemination shall have no right, obligation
or interest with respect to such donor."). Other states which have similar donor-type provi-
sions include California, Connecticut, Montana, Oregon, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin,
and Nevada. For further discussion, see supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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that the child would be more the carrier's than would be an analogous
artificial insemination donor child as to the husband, since the carrier
has at least performed part of the maternal role.
What was once known as the strongest presumption of the law,' 95
that is, that the husband of the mother is the father of the child, is of
limited utility. The ramifications if both the egg donor and the carrier
are married should be considered. Statutes should clearly delineate the
rights and obligations of the male partners. If a married egg donor changes
her mind prior to embryo transfer, should her husband be deemed the
father of the child? In Louisiana and other states, if he has agreed to
her insemination by the sperm of the other women's husband, he would
be deemed the father of the child, 96 absent a contrary provision in the
law. Should the biological father wish to assert paternal rights, the ques-
tion of dual paternity might arise.
Care in selecting ovum donors in embryo transfer is as important as
the selection of sperm donors in artificial insemination donor. '9 7 Testing
for diseases and chromosomal defects should be required of ovum
donors. 9  Additionally, it might be advisable to set age restrictions for
egg donors since maternal age is so closely linked to Down's syndrome
and other chromosomal defects."' As with an artificial insemination donor,
limitations on the number of egg donations might be considered in order
to avoid incest problems."' 0
If a carrier contracts to provide a womb for the fertilized egg of
another, problems similar to those involving surrogate mothers arise, such
as guidelines for the surrogate's behavior during pregnancy and the
establishment of remedies should she change her mind and decide to abort
the child."0 ' Unless her contract amounts to a waiver of her constitutionally
protected right to privacy,2"2 a carrier could abort a child that is not even
genetically hers. This possibility of aborting a child could also arise if
the lavage is unsuccessful in removing the fertilized egg.2"3
195. La. Civ. Code art 184. The Louisiana jurisprudence is repleat with cases upholding
the strength of this presumption. See, e.g., Feazel v. Feazel, 222 La. 113, 62 So. 2d 119
(La. 1952); Mock v. Mock, 411 So. 2d 1063 (La. 1982).
196. See La. Civ. Code art. 188.
197. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
198. Compare supra notes 52-53.
199. Chromosomal problems occur in the following frequency: wonien who are 20 years
old have problems 1/1000; 30 years old, 1/500; 35 years old, 1/200; 40 years old, 1/50;
44 and over, 1/20. Dickey interview, supra note 33. See also Dickey, Patient Information,
supra note 21, for breakdown between overall genetic abnormalities compared to Downs
Syndrome.
200. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 199.
202. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
203. The possibility of an unsuccessful lavage is noted to donors and their husbands
in the screening process at UCLA. See Brotman, supra note 190, at 42.
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Many opponents of embryo transplant are concerned about the com-
mercial aspects of ovum or womb donation.114 Originally, it was con-
templated that each ovum donor be paid fifty dollars a flush with a 200
dollar bonus if a fertilized egg was retrieved.2'" Although the going rate
for womb donors has not yet been an issue, the idea of receiving a fee
for the use of one's body to incubate a child is manifest with public policy
considerations. Many fear that in either donation, women, particularly
poor women, will be exploited and demeaned.2"6
Opponents to the process are particularly concerned about the fact
that Fertility and Genetic Research, Inc., in California has applied for
a patent for the process. The patent application is for the catheter used
in the lavage and for the method of using the instrument.2"7 Although
other medical processes have been patented,2 ' the fact that the patent
application for embryo transfer is backed by a corporation supports those
alleging commercialization.2 9
CONCLUSION
The severance of sexual intercourse from the reproductive process
raises innumerable legal questions, most of which are intricately related
to social and ethical ramifications. Balancing the interests of participating
parties, resulting children, and society is no easy task, since the protec-
tion of one group could be at the expense of another. Such an endeavor
must, therefore, be approached with open minds and hearts.2"'
Clearly, current legislation is inadequate to handle these new
technologies which, if even imagined, were considered science fiction when
204. Schroeder, New Life: Person or Property, 131:5 Am. J. Psych. 541, 542 (1974).
Note that the UCLA clinic put an advertisement in several community and college newspapers
to get ovum donors: "Help An Infertile Woman Have a Baby: Fertile women, age 20-35
willing to donate an egg. Similar to artificial insemination. No surgery required. Reasonable
compensation." Four hundred women responded, from which only 21 were selected as suitable.
205. Fleming, New Frontiers in Conception: Medical Breakthrough and Moral Dilem-
mas, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1980, § 6 (Magazine).
206. Ramsey, Testimony on In Vitro Fertilization, in Ethics Advisory Board, Appendix,
supra note 21, § 7, at 3.
207. Brotman, supra note 190, at 42.
208. Lawrence G. Sucsy, Chairman of Fertitlity and Genetic Research, Inc., notes that
eye, brain, and stomach surgical methods have been patented, as has a non-surgical way
of reversing female sterilization. Id. at 47.
209. Betty Jane Anderson, Associate General Counsel at the American Medical Associa-
tion, indicates that this is detrimental to the public as it restricts dissemination of medical
procedures. Id. at 47.
210. In consideration of the ethical questions raised by in vitro fertilization, Richard
A. McCormick, S.J., member of the Ethics Advisory Board, noted: "Some would say the
child ought to be born out of an act of love, but sexual intercourse is not the only act
of love in marriage." McCormick, Ethical Questions: A Look at the Issues, 20 Contem-
porary OB/GYN 227, 228 (1982).
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existing laws were promulgated. Undoubtedly, childless couples will seek
out these medical techniques in an effort to become parents. Thus, a
blanket prohibition of the methods would probably be as successful as
the alcohol experiment of the twenties; indeed, the goal of parenthood
is presumably more innate.
The other extreme of laissez-faire, however, could ultimately prove
equally disastrous. Today, as sperm donors may be selected through
catalogues, 2 ' and frozen embryo banks are being established, 2 some con-
sideration should be given to legislating boundaries for the procedures
and regulating standards for currently existing practices. However, the
fear of abuse must be tempered by sensitivity to the delicate personal
interests involved.
211. "Specialty sperm banks" now exist with catalogues detailing the specific qualities
of each donor. A couple wishing artificial insemination can examine a catalogue and choose
a donor with characteristics that the couple would like their offspring to possess. Dickey
interview, supra note 33. See also High-IQ Sperm Bank Yields Baby, The Times Picayune/The
States Item, May 25, 1982, § I at 2, col. 5. The Reposity for Germinal Choice was established
in 1979 to make available the sperm of Nobel Prize winners and other creative, intelligent
people.
212. Clinic May Produce Test-Tube Babies from Donated Eggs, The Times-Picayune/The
States Item, July 7, 1983, § I, at 6, col. I (Eggs would be obtained from women undergo-
ing abdominal surgery. The eggs would be donated without payment.); British Study Em-
bryo Banks, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1982, § 1, at 26, col. 6 (A plan to set up frozen embryo
banks prompted government investigation by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.).
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